\ said:
The only criticism of Dowding was his failure to develop night fighters but then no body else seemed to either until it was found necessary. What was Portal doing ?
Laurie
This is another can 'o worms!
Douglas (Deputy Chief of the Air Staff) sent a long memo about night interception problems to Newall (his boss,Chief of the Air Staff) on 28 August 1940. He urged that they needed to be tackled "rather more vigorously than at present" and suggested that "Dowding was pinning his faith almost entirely on the Beaufighter and AI" (airborne interception). Neither of these were operationally ready. Douglas thought that more Defiant,Blenheim and Hurricane squadrons should be used at night and standing patrols (an old chestnut dismissed by Dowding and Park as a waste of time and resources,even in daylight) should be instituted over major targets. Douglas also suggested removing the Blenheim's mid upper turret,which he said would give another 15 mph on the top speed,and modify the engines for 100 octane fuel currently reserved for Spitfires and Hurricanes.
Newall did not express an opinion but Dowding replied to Douglas on 7 September raising a series of practical points. How long would it take to modify the Blenheims? What would be the effect on the aircraft's Cof G? How long to modify Mercury engines for 100 octane fuel? The Defiant squadrons he reminded Douglas had failed totally as day fighters and their crews were not trained in night flying,let alone night fighting. He was,reluctantly,maintaining standing patrols over some targets. He concluded that he was busy with the day battle being waged over South East England (this was the height of the BoB) but would be happy to discuss the subject further next time Douglas visited Bentley Priory.
He had already written to Douglas on 28th August explaining his reluctance to employ his Hurricane squadrons at night and emphasising that the Beaufighter was Britain's only realistic chance of an effective night fighter.
Park issued sensible instructions for the operation of night fighter wings on 27th October 1940. The tactics "once the enemy has been seen,are those of a cat stalking a mouse rather than a greyhound chasing a hare."
Both men were let down by the inability of British technology to bridge the gap between the research being done Bawdsey (where Watson-Watt had shifted all his research to,against Dowding's wishes) and the practicalities of fitting this sort of equipment into aeroplanes. There was a muddle at the Air Ministry,lack of qualified technicians whose priority was anyway the Chain Home system,a reluctance of the Air Ministry to involve the electronics industry and so on.It was Dowding,along with Tizard,who finally involved EMI in the program and it was that company that finally turned the research into a viable system.
It was too late to prevent the night time blitz.Alarmed by the raids Whitehall did what it still does best,it formed a committee of instant experts under Salmond and included Freeman,Tedder and Douglas. On 17th September 1940 they came up with a set of recommendations about which Dowding was only asked the following day. Dowding unwisely rejected them in his blunt style. He was wrong to do so and on at least one point,his refusal to decentralise filtering to Group level,probably wrong.
After this Dowding's days were numbered.
Salmond told Sinclair,Beaverbrook and Churchill that Dowding must go. He also wrote to Trenchard that " Dowding has not the qualifications of a commander in the field,as he lacks humanity and imagination."
He also wrote that Newall,because "his strategic judgement is completely at fault" should go too.
He then wrote his infamous letter to Churchill
"I am most anxious to put to you the case for a change in the holder of the important position of C-in-C Fighter Command. Recently,on Lord Beaverbrook's instructions,I have carried out an enquiry intonight air defence,the result of which,together with what has since occurred,makes a change,in my opinion,imperative. This opinion is also very strongly held bymost,if not all,service members of the Air Council."
Admiral Tom Phillips,who knew precisely nothing about airborne interception stuck his oar in as Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. In his opinion the interception of night bombers was the most important problem facing Britain's defenders. Unfortunately when he communicated his opinion and trite suggestions to Churchill on 16th October 1940 Britain had neither an effective airborne radar,nor a fighter to carry it. Phillip's solution was to have day fighters flying patrols over London at night.
Dowding responded
"You will note that Admiral Phillips suggests no method of employment of fighters but would merely revert to a Micawber like method of ordering them to fly about an wait for something to turn up."
Salmond and his advisors were wrong and Dowding was right about how to defeat the night bombers. The lack of an effective,radar equipped night fighter from September 1940 onwards sealed his fate. Dowding was not good at politics which didn't help his cause, he finally left on 25th November 1940.
Sorry for the long post......I did say that Dowding is one of my heroes!
Steve