Battle of Britain diary

[colin m]

Great reading again Steve, thanks for your efforts.

 

[stona]

Fantastic work, building nicely to the climax......pity we can’t have Walton’s suite playing in the background!

I think that most would agree that the next week, as the Luftwaffe concentrated on Fighter Command's infrastructure and, to a certain extent, the British aircraft industry, was the critical phase of the Battle for the British. Most will also be aware that next Saturday, the 7th, would see the Battle take a different course.

I blame 'that film'

 

[adt70hk]

Steve

Again brilliantly put together. It actually makes me feel nervous and yet I know the outcome. Excellent writing and all credit to you.

ATB

Andrew

 

[stona]

Thanks Andrew, I do my best.

Because I'm not working I have the time to sit down for a couple of hours or so and go through various books (which don't always agree by the way*!) and try and put together a fairly concise account of each day.

I hope that it gives people a feel of the events each day, if I can do that, then I'm happy with it. These were momentous times and as we approach the culmination of the Battle the outcome was by no means sure.

*I don't pretend to be always right, but I do cross check and go with the majority

 

[stona]

Sunday 1 September

Fair with some cloud clearing in the afternoon.

A new month but Fighter Command remained the target.

After the Luftwaffe’s maximum effort on the previous day the morning started quietly. Fighter Command withdrew Nos 151 and 56 Squadrons, the latter leaderless and down to seven aircraft, to be replaced by Nos 46 and 249 Squadrons. Only No 79 Squadron remained at a battered Biggin Hill to provide airfield defence.

10.20 and the first large raids are plotted assembling over France. 14 squadrons were scrambled and began intercepting the raids as they crossed the coast between Dungeness and Margate. In a familiar tactic the raid split, two groups of about 30 bombers each. Fierce fighting developed over N E Kent and the Thames estuary. No 85 Squadron tangled with escorting Bf 109s, shooting two down. Nos 1, 54 and 72 Squadrons also joined the fighting, the last losing three Spitfires when it was bounced by the Bf 109s of JG 26. The large number of escorts managed to fend off the British fighters and the bombers got through, Detling, Eastchurch (yet again) and the London Docks were all bombed. At Biggin Hill No 79 Squadron was caught on the ground and lost a Hurricane.

Shortly after 13.30 the Luftwaffe returned and 170 aircraft crossed the Kent coast. Nos 1,54,72, 85, 253 and 616 Squadrons were scrambled. Three squadrons (253, 616 and 72) intercepted the raiders in the Folkestone-Hastings area followed by No 85 inland near Lympne. An 85 Squadron Hurricane landed at Lympne with engine trouble and was promptly bombed by the Luftwaffe. The fighters were unable to prevent the raid forcing its way towards Biggin Hill and Kenley. The squadrons reserved for airfield defence now scrambled, including No 79 from Biggin Hill. Both Biggin Hill and Kenley were bombed. No 85 Squadron, which stayed with the raid as it forced its way north suffered more losses losing four Hurricanes. It was now operational only in name and would soon be withdrawn from the Battle.

Later in the afternoon the Luftwaffe once again sent fighter sweeps into the Channel and across the south coast. For the most part Fighter Command refused to be drawn, even when fighters strafed some of its airfields. On a personal note, it was during this period that my own grandmother, who lived near Canterbury, had her own experience with German fighters. Seeing two low flying aeroplanes she waved to them, assuming that they were ‘ours’. Shortly after they strafed the local railway station, leaving no doubt that they were not!

At 17.30 the last wave of attacks came. Hawkinge and Lympne were bombed by raids that were not detected and Biggin Hill was hit again and finally rendered non-operational. Its last squadron, No 79, moved to Croydon. No 151 squadron, which had been fighting in 11 Group since the Fall of France had lost 11 pilots killed. This evening it packed up and withdrew to Digby (12 Group) to rest and re-form.

The Luftwaffe had flown just half the number of sorties of the previous day, but it had got through to its targets and caused considerable damage. The RAF had lost 16 fighters with 4 more damaged. The Luftwaffe had lost just 8 aircraft on operations against Britain, with the same number damaged.

Tonight, up to 200 bombers from Luftflotte 3 would concentrate their bombing on the area of the Bristol Channel. Swansea was badly bombed with 33 people killed and another 115 injured. Bristol also hit by scattered bombing.

The narrow margin was narrowing further. Both sides understood that the battle was entering a critical and decisive phase.

 

[stona]

Monday 2 September

A fine warm day after early morning mists had cleared.

The Luftwaffe was off to an early start today. A large raid was plotted forming over Calais at 07.00. Five squadrons, sixty fighters were scrambled to intercept the raid and patrol 11 Group’s airfields. Having crossed the coast the raid divided, as was now common practice, and fanned out to attack Biggin Hill, Rochford, Eastchurch and North Weald. Nos. 222 and 249 Squadrons managed to break up the formation attacking North Weald and no bombs fell on the airfield. No 249 lost three aircraft in the effort. No 72 Squadron managed to intercept the Biggin Hill raid, but while fighting through the escort nine Do 17s flew in at low level and bombed the airfield causing further damage. The raids on Rochford and Eastchurch were more successful. At Rochford an ammunition dump was hit, with predictable consequences. Five aircraft were destroyed on the ground. No 603 Squadron was scrambled from Hornchurch when it looked like that airfield might be bombed. It consequently chased this raid as it retired, downing three Bf 109s.

At 12.00 another large raid of 250 bombers and fighters was plotted approaching Dover. Park ordered his fighters off earlier, in an attempt to engage the raid before it split up and made for its various targets. No 72 Squadron was the first to engage just north of Rochester. No 603 joined east of Sheerness, losing three of its fighters. The German formation managed to split into several separate raids and fighting continued over most of Kent. Nos 111 and 222 Squadrons both sustained losses, No 43 Squadron shot down two Bf 109s for the loss of three of its own. The large escort once again succeeded in keeping most of the British fighters away from the bombers. Biggin Hill, Kenley and Hornchurch were all targeted, only Hornchurch was saved by No 603 Squadron which managed to break up the bomber formation, causing them to jettison their bombs over open countryside.

We have a description of Kenley from Corporal Bob Morris, who moved to Kenley this day with No 66 Squadron.

“When we of No 66 Squadron arrived at Kenley it was an absolute shambles, there was hardly a building left standing. As we drove around the aerodrome to our assembly point, I saw a car park full of vehicles – but there was not one which hadn’t been riddled by gunfire or shrapnel. There were shelters destroyed, buildings flattened. We knew that we would be in for a hard time.”

In a few days, Park would make what some later historians have attempted to characterise as a pessimistic report about 11 Group’s infrastructure, but Kenley was not atypical of several of his airfields at this time. They were still, mostly, operating but were far from unscathed.

At 17.30 the Luftwaffe was again over Kent and 250 aircraft, at least 160 of which were fighters, were met by Nos. 46, 72, 111, 222, 501, 603 and 616 Squadrons. Detling and Eastchurch were hit again. At Eastchurch, which seems to have been one of the most frequent targets for the Luftwaffe, the bomb dump was hit and exploded, destroying almost everything in a 400 yard radius. Buildings, drainage, telephone and electricity lines and many buildings were destroyed along with five aircraft. It was the final straw for Eastchurch, which became non-operational. The bombers also reached aircraft factories. At Brooklands the Vickers works, producing Wellingtons was hit, but the Hawker factory producing Hurricanes was not, a lucky escape. Short Bros at Rochester was hit again.

At the end of the day Fighter Command had lost 14 fighters with 18 more ‘damaged but repairable’. The Luftwaffe had managed to attack seven airfields and two vital factories, for which it had lost or written off 34 aircraft (not the often reported 22) in operations against Britain with 11 more damaged. 21 of the aircraft shot down were Bf 109s, one of the worst days of the Battle for these units.

The Luftwaffe made an effort tonight, about 120 bombers attacking various targets. They followed what were becoming two established routes. Dieppe-Sussex to London and Birmingham or Cherbourg-Hampshire-Dorset-Gloucestershire and on to the Midlands and North West.

In an earlier post I mentioned Intelligence Officers having to make a report on ‘a smoking hole in the ground’. There was a case of that today.



Here an officer takes notes on the smoking hole left by Werner Kluge’s Bf 109 which dived into the ground at Streets Farm, Ulcombe, about six miles SE of Maidstone. Kluge attempted to bale out but was killed.

I’ll also post a picture of the wing of Anton Glomb’s Bf 109 which was shot down today, crashing into Cale Hill Park, Little Chart, in Kent. I've posted this to dispel another ‘myth’ of the Battle of Britain. In this context myths are sacred cows which have become reinforced by repetition, particularly on the internet, over the last thirty years or so.



The myth: Bf 109s had superior armament to the Spitfire and Hurricane because they were all cannon armed, having two MG FF 20mm cannon in the wings.

The facts: as many as 4 in 10 Bf 109s that flew in the Battle were still to E-1 standard and had two MG 17 machine guns in the wings, making a total of just four rifle calibre machine guns, just half the weight of armament of a Spitfire or Hurricane. Clearly visible in the picture is one of the wing mounted MG 17s. Many Crashed Enemy Aircraft Reports note the armament of downed Bf 109s as four MG 17s.

Although production of the Bf 109 E-1 version was terminated in August 1940, of 323 Bf 109s delivered to the units at the English Channel as late as in September 1940, exactly 100 were the E-1 version.

For the model builders, this was a 4./JG 2 aircraft and appears to have white wing tips.

 

[Tim Marlow]

Another great report. I’m starting to feel as if I’m living through this myself!

 

[stona]

Tuesday 3 September

Another fine and warm day, there was some haze in the Channel.

No 54 Squadron was a spent force and was replaced at Hornchurch by No 41. Al Deere calculated that during August his squadron had received 18 replacement pilots, but now the squadron could muster just 16 for the transfer north.

German preparations for an invasion continued and today Feldmarschall Keitel ordered embarkation of invasion material to begin loading in eight days’ time, on 11 September.

For its part, the Luftwaffe attempted to maintain the pressure on Fighter Command, once again targeting its airfields.

An initial plot was made at 08.30 and three squadrons were scrambled to intercept. They were ordered to disengage when it became apparent that this was a feint, comprised of fighters. However, by 09.30 another raid of 54 Do 17s escorted by 80 Bf 110s and 40 Bf 109s was approaching the Thames estuary, heading it was thought for North Weald or Debden. Nos 249, 17 and 603 Squadrons were scrambled. No 603 was bounced by the Bf 109s, losing two Spitfires. No 17 Squadron had three shot down. North Weald was heavily bombed, and estimated 200 bombs falling on the airfield, killing four people on the ground, and rendering the base temporarily non-operational. All the hangars were hit, as well as canteens, administrative buildings, and the Operations Room. Hornchurch and Debden were also hit, but with minor damage. As the bombers withdrew six more squadrons engaged the raid. Most heavily engaged was III./ZG 26, which was flying top cover and thus had more opportunities to manoeuvre than ZG 2, which was tied up as close escort. The Bf 110s of III./ZG 26 exacted a terrible toll on the attacking Hurricanes. No. 46 Squadron, which just two days earlier moved from a quiet corner in 12 Group’s area to 11 Group, lost three Hurricanes in a matter of minutes. No. 257 Squadron also lost three Hurricanes for only one unconfirmed kill in return. No 310 (Czech) Squadron, arriving late from 12 Group, managed to shoot down four of the Bf 110s. The cannon armed Spitfires of 19 Squadron also engaged, but once again their cannons let them down. No less than 21 British fighters, one in six of the RAF aircraft that took part in the combat, were shot down. Of these, 12 were written off while 9 would eventually be repaired. Once again Blenheims were attacked by mistake, one was shot down, two more damaged. They simply looked a lot like German medium bombers and most Fighter Command pilots were not expecting to come across British twins.

There were no significant raids during the rest of the day. Various formations flew over the Channel, occasionally penetrating inland to keep Fighter Command on its toes.

At the end of the day the RAF had lost or written off 16 aircraft with a further 11 damaged. The Luftwaffe had lost 11 aircraft with 4 more damaged. It was a bad day for Fighter Command.

Tonight, no more than 100 bombers raided the UK. Merseyside and the Bristol Channel area were the principal targets, with bombs also falling on Bournemouth and Southampton, probably ‘jettisoned’ by aircraft returning to France having failed to identify their targets.

In attacking the airfields Kesselring was trying to do two things. Force the British fighters to come up or face destruction on the ground and to make their bases unusable. Inadvertently he was doing another, attacking Fighter Command’s command and control system in the form of the operations rooms at the Sector stations, even though he had no idea that they existed. He had achieved some success, though as usual the Luftwaffe over estimated this.

Today, crucial decisions were taken which would have a decisive influence on the rest of the Luftwaffe campaign. Thousands of words have been written about this, so here are a few more

A meeting between Goering and his senior commanders took place in The Hague. Luftwaffe Intelligence indicated that Fighter Command was running out or aircraft and that its bases in the SE of England were in ruins. The first was just incorrect, the second only partly true. Kesselring argued that one more effort was required to defeat Fighter Command and force its fighters to come up and fight. If not, they might retreat north of the Thames, out of range of the Bf 109, and still be capable of opposing an invasion. The best way to achieve this, according to Kesselring, the man who had overseen the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam, was attacks on London. He believed that such attacks could render an invasion unnecessary and save the lives of ‘100,000 German soldiers’. Sperrle was not so sure and made it clear that he distrusted German assessments of Fighter Command’s supposedly much reduced capability. It was Kesselring who won the day, with the authority of Goering who knew that Hitler was now ready to countenance such a move, though we know this would not be for three more days.

This was a new position for Goering. It is not true that he had been a long-term advocate for the terror bombing of the British population, or of attacks on the capital itself. As early as 13 August, at a meeting with Hitler, Jodl proposed the launching of ‘ruthless air raids on London’. But Goering was of an entirely different opinion. ‘The main task is to continue to strike against the enemy fighter force in southern England.’ There were several senior officers in the Luftwaffe that argued for attacks on London and British morale. These included not only Kesselring, the commander of Luftflotte 2, and General Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, commanding Fliegerkorps VIII, but also General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. It seems that Goering was not persuaded by their arguments about inferior British morale, but rather by the Intelligence reports he was receiving. There was certainly a political aspect to the decision, Hitler was becoming exasperated by British attacks on Berlin.

It was Goering who would communicate the decision to the rest of the Luftwaffe.

“My fellow commanders, we are now on the brink of victory. An assault and an invasion of England is now more promising than ever before. Our Intelligence has now informed us that the RAF is now down to less than one hundred fighter aircraft, the airfields protected London are now out of action because of the superb and accurate bombing of our bomber forces, their communications are in disarray, and now we are told, their air commanders are arguing with each other.

Gentleman, another phase is now almost complete. The RAF is now no longer the great threat that it used to be, and we can now draw every available fighter plane that the RAF has into the air, because the next target must be London itself.”

There is almost nothing correct in this assessment, but it would form the Luftwaffe’s basis for the next phase of the Battle.

 

[Tim Marlow]

There lies the great “what if” of the campaign. Just as the German airforce was finally starting to make headway they changed tactics and threw away their hard won advantage. What if they had reintroduced Ju87s at this point to attack chain home stations and continued the airfield attacks? The impetus could well have swung their way.

 

[stona]

There lies the great “what if” of the campaign. Just as the German airforce was finally starting to make headway they changed tactics and threw away their hard won advantage. What if they had reintroduced Ju87s at this point to attack chain home stations and continued the airfield attacks? The impetus could well have swung their way.

Yes. There are some strange arguments made about this. One is that the Luftwaffe turned to London in desperation because they were not winning the battle with Fighter Command. In fact the reverse is true, at least from a German perspective. They believed that they had all but defeated Fighter Command. Goering had resisted all pressure to attack London and other metropolitan areas and was only persuaded by the intelligence reports which indicated that the campaign against Fighter Command had already been a success. The problem was that while it had achieved some successes these were nowhere near as great as the Germans believed.

We will see over the coming days that while Park (and Dowding) were realistic about the damage being done to their Commands, neither believed that they were about to lose the Battle, even had the Germans maintained the pressure. They were aware of the losses the Luftwaffe was suffering. Though these too were somewhat exaggerated this was mitigated by the effect of the initial British over estimation of Luftwaffe strength.

The British were prepared for and willing to fight a battle of attrition, as we shall see in the next few days. The Germans were supposed to be laying the groundwork for an invasion and had strict time and force limitations, even though the British did not know this. They could not fight a long battle of attrition, even had they wanted to.

 

[stona]

Wednesday 4 September

Another fine and warm day.

The Luftwaffe’s change of strategy had been announced, but it could not be enacted immediately. Though the next few days saw some significant action, almost all the accounts of the Battle skim over them in an attempt to get to the 7th and the first major assault on London. This does a disservice to what was a critical phase of the Battle for Fighter Command, as Park’s report on the state of 11 Group on the 6th would make clear.

Hitler confirmed the forthcoming change of strategy in a radio speech, broadcast from Berlin’s Sportpalast.

“While German fliers are over England day after day, Churchill’s night raiders indiscriminately drop their bombs over towns and villages and farms wherever a light is showing…For three months I have been holding back the order to retaliate, but Churchill mistook that for a sign of weakness. We are going to give them their answer night after night from now on. When the British Air Force drops two or three or four thousand kilograms of bombs, then we will in one night drop 150-, 230-, 300- or 400,000 kilograms. When they declare that they will increase their attacks on our cities, then we will raze their cities to the ground.”

Bombs had already been falling on British civilians for more than three months and more than a thousand had been killed by the end of August, but to switch the entire weight of the Luftwaffe against London was a decisive change in strategy.

For now, Fighter Command and the aircraft industry, successfully attacked in the last few days, remained the primary targets.

Following raids between 09.15 and 10.15 on Lympne, Bradwell on Sea and a now disabled Eastchurch the main Luftwaffe assault came after midday.

RDF plotted raids amounting to more than 300 aircraft approaching Folkestone, Poling RDF station and Brighton. 70 bombers and 200 Bf 109s were heading for their targets. As usual the raid split, one formation heading for Rochester, Eastchurch and Rochford, the other to Weybridge and Brooklands. Fighter Command reacted with 14 Squadrons, including the newly arrived No 66 from Kenley, which lost five Spitfires in the fighting. Under cover of the main raids, 14 bomb carrying Bf 110s of Eprg 210, escorted by about 50 Bf 110s from ZG 2, III./ZG 76 and V.(Z)/LG 1 crossed the coast near Littlehampton and attempted to make a low level approach on the Hawker factory at Brooklands. Unfortunately, the diversions had only served to alert Fighter Command which attacked the Bf 110s as they were tracked inland by the Observer Corps. No 253 Squadron, up from Kenley, was the first to intercept, shooting down 5 Bf 110s. Hurricanes from Nos 1(RCAF), 43, 253 and 601 Squadrons and Spitfires from Nos 72 and 79 Squadrons all made interceptions of the various raids, but the escorts managed to protect the bombers and fighter bombers. Eprg 210 efficiently bombed the Vickers works but again the Hawker works was missed. Six 500 Kg bombs hit the machine shops and Wellington assembly sheds, killing 88 and wounding many more. Production was completely stopped for four days and later estimates reckoned that this raid cost the production of 125 bombers. This success came at a price. V.(Z)/LG 1 lost four aircraft and crews, including Oberleutnant Michel Junge, the commander of 14. Staffel. III./ZG 76 was even worse hit and lost six crews, while ZG 2 escaped with a single loss. II./ZG 76, which arrived to meet the fighter bombers and their embattled escort as they withdrew probably prevented even higher losses.

Most of Kent had become an aerial battlefield, bombs falling on Eastchurch, Lympne, Brooklands, Shoreham, Rochester airport and Richford. Apart from the damage caused at Vickers Brooklands serious damage was reported at Pobjoy’s factory at Rochester. Once again, the bombers had got through.

The RAF had lost 15 of its fighters with a further 15 damaged but repairable. The large number of damaged aircraft landing back at their bases or making forced landings elsewhere gave the British an advantage not afforded to the Germans, whose damaged aircraft either made it back to France or were lost. The Luftwaffe had lost 22 aircraft, including no less than 15 Bf 110s today, with another 4, including 1 Bf 110, damaged.

Tonight, as many as 200 bombers returned to British airspace. A few bombs fell across London but there were sustained raids on Liverpool, Sleaford, Tilbury, Stoke on Trent, Bournemouth and Bristol.

 

[stona]

Thursday 5 September

The weather remains fine, but with some cloud developing later.

The Luftwaffe mounted two major operations today. Between 09.40 and 10.40 several raids totalling about 170 aircraft attacked various targets in Kent. This tactic caused some confusion at the Bentley Priory filter room, and more so at 11 Group’s control room. Some squadrons found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time and at the wrong height. These raids were initially met by four squadrons, including No 501, patrolling Canterbury, which was the first to engage. They were followed by No.41, which shot down two Bf 109s and damaged two bombers over the Thames estuary and then No 603. More than 100 fighters were now involved in a huge dogfight over Kent. No 111 Squadron confronted a formation of more than 100 enemy aircraft over Dungeness. No 19 Squadron took on another large formation over Hornchurch. It had reverted to eight-gun Spitfires, having swopped its unreliable cannon armed aircraft for some clapped out fighters from the OTU at Haywarden on the 4th. The squadron diary noted

“First day with the eight-gun machines and what wrecks. At least the guns will fire…”

The squadron lost one Spitfire with two more damaged. Lympne, Eastchurch and Biggin Hill all reported bombing, but damage was minor.

At 15.00 150 aircraft in three formations crossed the coast between Deal and Dover. One fighter sweep turned back after a few minutes. The other two continued to Canterbury where they split, a larger 100+ formation made for Biggin Hill, the other towards the Thames estuary. No 73 Squadron was the first to intercept, damaging one He 111 before being bounced by escorting Bf 109s, losing four Hurricanes. The Bf 109s were in turn attacked by No 303 (Polish) Squadron which accounted for three of them. The Biggin Hill raid turned back, retiring via Maidstone and Rochester. The fighters were unable to prevent the other raid bombing the Thameshaven oil storage facility, causing a huge fire, before it to withdrew. While this was going on a smaller formation of just six bombers with an escort of 20 Bf 109s came in and accurately bombed the airfield at Detling causing considerable damage.

The RAF had lost 19 aircraft, with 15 more damaged. The Luftwaffe had also lost 19 aircraft, many of them Bf 109s, with 8 more damaged.

This afternoon Goering’s personal train carried him from Germany across the Low Countries to France. Having had Hitler’s approval for an aerial assault on London he intended to be at the front for forthcoming events. Goering not only had his own personal train, he had a substantial model railway layout at his country residence, Carinhall, NE of Berlin.



About 100 bombers returned tonight. Bombing was widespread but worst hit were London and Liverpool.

One of the victims of the first series of raids was perhaps the most infamous Luftwaffe pilot to be shot down in the Battle. His aircraft, in which he made an excellent belly landing at Love’s Farm, near Marden, Kent, is certainly one of the most modelled. This was, of course, ‘the one that got away’, Oberleutnant Franz von Werra, Gruppenadjutant of II./JG 3.

The story begins with P/O Robin Rafter of No 603 Squadron, an extremely inexperienced pilot who had soon been shot down in the melee. He was thrown out of his Spitfire and found himself in his parachute. Later he recounted his experience in a letter to his mother.

“Now the most terrifying experience happened. I floated down, right through the aerial battle that was taking place. I came through it without a scratch, but then I noticed a 109 coming towards me, and you have no idea what a damned fool you feel suspended in mid-air with an enemy fighter buzzing around you. Well, he never fired at me, as a Spitfire came along and drove him off; whether he would have done or not cannot be said.”

The Bf 109 circling Rafter was that of Franz von Werra and the Spitfire that drove him off was that of P/O Gerald ‘Stapme’ Stapleton, also of 603 Squadron, who gave this account.

“I was diving to attack the bombers when I was engaged by two Me 109s. When I fired at the first one I noticed glycol coming from his radiator. I did a No. 2 attack and as I fired was hit by bullets from another 109. I broke off downwards and continued my dive. At 6,000 ft I saw a single-engined machine diving vertically with no tail unit [this was Rafter’s Spitfire]. I looked up and saw a parachutist coming down circled by an Me 109. I attacked him (the 109) from the low quarter; he dived vertically for the ground then flattened out at ground level. I then did a series of beam attacks from both sides, and the enemy aircraft turned into my attacks. He finally force landed. He tried to set his radio on fire by taking off his jacket and setting fire to it and putting it into the cockpit. He was prevented by the LDV”.

Von Werra’s Bf 109, one of the most photographed of the Battle



Rafter had suffered a nasty head injury when he was thrown through the hood of his Spitfire. He returned to his unit the week after the Battle of Britain officially ended and was killed on 29 November when his Spitfire inexplicably fell out of formation and dived into the ground. His sister believed that he returned to action too soon.

“I suspect that his head wound was insufficiently healed and that on the day he crashed and was killed Robin simply blacked out.”

He is buried with his brother (who was killed in a flying accident in October 1940) and father at Harborne Church, Birmingham, not far from where I type this.

 

[stona]

Friday 6 September

The fine weather continues, though today is somewhat cooler.

As the Luftwaffe made its final plans for the assault on London, Kesselring maintained the pressure on Fighter Command, adopting a similar tactic to the last few days. In three phases, many raids made for targets including Fighter Command’s infrastructure and the aircraft industry.

Between 08.30 and 10.00 a total of five raids, some 250 aircraft, came across the coast between Romney and Ramsgate, fanning out to attack their targets. Many of the southern airfields were attacked again, including that at Farnborough which was not a Fighter Command field. This raid was intercepted by No 234 Squadron from 10 Group. Two of its Spitfires were shot down by Bf 109s of JG 26, but 7./JG 26 lost three Bf 109s. No 303 (Polish) Squadron was bounced attempting to break up bombers over Kent, losing five of its Hurricanes. Eprg. 210 was back in the action, making a trademark low level attack on the Hawker works at Brooklands. Escorted by Bf 110s of V./(Z) LG 1 and I./ZG 76 the fighter bombers reached the target unscathed, but the bombing caused little damage. As they withdrew, elements of No 1 Squadron engaged, shooting down one Bf 110 in exchange for one of its Hurricanes.

A second series of raids, 200 aircraft in four formations, headed for Maidstone and the Thames estuary before splitting up and making for various targets. Once again Fighter Command’s airfields were targeted. Damage was light, but an ongoing battle developed between 12.45 and 14.00 which saw steady losses inflicted on both sides.

A third series of raids involved 150 aircraft flying over the Thames estuary between 17.30 and 19.00. Bombing was widespread and ineffective, the oil facilities at Thameshaven, still burning following yesterday’s raids, were bombed again. No 41 Squadron surprised JG 27, claiming several Bf 109s.

The RAF had lost 19 of its fighters with another 15 damaged. The Luftwaffe had lost 25 aircraft in operations against Britain with another 5 damaged.

Tonight, the Luftwaffe operations were much reduced as it prepared for the next phase of the Battle. Liverpool was bombed again, as was the still burning oil facility at Thameshaven.

Fighter Command was on the ropes. It was not down, and it certainly was not out. Its senior officers were realistic, not pessimistic, and unlike their German counterparts were prepared to pass their genuine assessments of the situation up their chains of command. Today Park prepared an assessment of the state of 11 Group.

“Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy’s bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes and also to six out of seven of our sector stations. There was a critical period when the damage to sector stations and our ground organisation was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of our squadrons, who could not be given the same good technical and administrative service as previously…The absence of many essential telephone lines, the use of scratch equipment in emergency operations rooms, and the general dislocation of ground organisation, was seriously felt for about a week in the handling of squadrons by day to meet the enemy’s massed attacks, which were continued without the former occasional break of a day.”

The pilot shortage was also becoming critical. This was a problem that would be addressed tomorrow. Dowding had already called a meeting between himself, some of his officers and Sholto-Douglas to be held at Bentley Priory. The issue is best illustrated by this entry in the diary of S/Ldr A. V. R. ‘Sandy’ Johnstone of No 602 Squadron.

“Two further pilots have come to us straight from a Lysander squadron with no experience on fighter aircraft. Apparently, demand has now outstripped supply and there are no trained pilots available in the Training Units, which means that we will just have to train them ourselves. However, it remains to be seen whether we can spare the hours, as we are already short of aircraft for our own operational needs. It seems a funny way to run a war.”

‘A funny way to run a war’ indeed, but the whole course of the Battle was about to change.

 

[scottie3158]

Steve,
I am thoroughly enjoying this especially as I grew up in Maidstone so the local references cast visions in my mind.

 

[Tim Marlow]

Great report as always. You write in a vital and engaging style. Real edge of the seat stuff.

 

[stona]

@Paul. Maidstone really was in the thick of it. Anyone flying from the Calais region to London is pretty much going right over the top of you, plus many of Fighter Command's vital aerodromes were in Kent between the coast and the London suburbs. Many interceptions were made in the area. I remember the BoB museum excavating a Hurricane that came down on a terrace of houses in the town during the Battle, killing both the pilot and several members of the same family on the ground, including 5 or 6 children (?). It was many years ago and I don't remember the details, I might look them up for a later post if applicable

@Tim, thanks very much. Trying to condense everything into a sensible post is quite fun, and probably helps make it seem a bit more pacey. I enjoy the first hand accounts and individual detail and I hope others do to.
Obviously, I leave out a lot of the mind numbing detail I'll leave that to the proper historians.
I've been trying to condense tomorrow's events and will have another go this morning, now the grand kids have been handed back! Tomorrow was a big day, as those reading this will be well aware. It was decisive in the minds of some at the time (and since).

 

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

Fair again, with some haze clearing later.

Today was, in my humble opinion, the decisive day of the Battle. London ‘Loge’ was to be the target of the Luftwaffe’s efforts. It is impossible to understand why this was such an important change in strategy without an appreciation of the effect of the previous two weeks’ impact on Fighter Command. Yesterday Park had written his report on the state of 11 Group. Today Dowding convened a meeting at Bentley Priory to address the crisis in his Command, and discuss ways of not only ‘going downhill’ as slowly as possible, but ways of ensuring returning to the top of the hill would be as easy as possible.

I will split today’s post into four parts. The first two are not regular diary entries, which I will post in the third and fourth sections, covering the action and its aftermath, so you can skip to ‘Parts 3 and 4’ if you are desperate to get to the action

Before leaving for Bentley Priory Park issued an instruction to his controllers. On one occasion the previous day just seven of the eighteen squadrons dispatched had made successful interceptions. It had come to his notice that some controllers were ordering their squadrons to altitudes a couple of thousand feet above that ordered by their Group controllers. In fear of being ‘bounced’ the squadron leaders were also adding a few thousand feet. As a result, the intercepting fighters were running directly into the escorting fighters, provoking exactly the fighter v fighter combat that Park was keen to avoid. The real targets, the bombers, were getting through, unmolested, below. On the 6th most bombers had only been intercepted after they bombed, and this was unacceptable. The practice had to stop forthwith.

Park (and Dowding’s) realism should not be taken for defeatism, as it has been by some writers recently. As they made their dispositions this morning Park had a conversation with his chief controller, Willoughby de Broke.

“I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses” Park said. Willoughby de Broke replied that he was indeed concerned. “Well,” Park said, “I’ve been looking at these casualty figures, and I’ve come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I’m damned certain that the Boche can’t. If we can hang on as we’re going, I’m sure we shall win in the end.”

PART ONE – THE CONFERENCE.

There were seven men present in the room. Dowding, Park, Evill and Nicholl of Fighter Command, Sholto-Douglas the effective Chief of the Air Staff as the actual CAS, Newall, faded into the background, a Group Captain from the Air Ministry and an NCO to take the minutes.

Dowding opened the meeting by assuming that the current measures to keep fully trained and fully equipped squadrons in the Battle would fail. The current policy had been to concentrate a large number of squadrons in the south-east with squadrons on the fringe brought in at Park’s request only on the worst days. Tired or defeated squadrons could be rotated out of the line and fresh ones brought in as required. We have seen this happening over that last few days of this critical period. However, it was apparent that if the present scale of attacks continued this replacement policy would become impossible. Dowding wanted to plan for such an eventuality. Both he and Park were opposed to the amalgamation of squadrons, though they might have to rob squadrons in the three supporting Groups of their operational pilots to make up shortages. It seemed that just about enough pilots would be available, the problem was how to turn them into combat pilots. Dowding also emphasised that the Germans must not be allowed to know how hard hit his command was, and that 11 Group had to be kept up to its current strength.

Douglas now intervened to ask whether they were being too pessimistic, talking about going downhill.

Dowding disagreed, stating that Park was already calling for reinforcements to five squadrons which had themselves only just come into the line.

Douglas said that there was no shortage of pilots, provoking Dowding to begin to explain the skills needed to be a combat ready, operational pilot. Douglas simply interrupted to say that Fighter Command would be kept up to strength. Douglas’s inability to understand the difference between a pilot fresh from the reduced OTU course and a fully operational pilot seems to have baffled Dowding. More than one historian writing on the battle has also failed to grasp this vital distinction.

Evill now intervened. Total casualties for the four weeks ending 4 September were 348. The three OTUs had produced just 280 pilots in the same period, a shortfall of 68, quite apart from accidents and illness.

Park added that casualty figures in 11 Group were running at nearly 100 a week. There was a pilot shortage. That day nine of his squadrons had started with fewer than 15 pilots and the previous day had seen squadrons assembled as composite units.

Dowding interrupted with his now famous comment. ‘You must realise’ he said, ‘that we are going downhill’.

Park continued. It was better to have twenty one squadrons with no fewer than twenty one pilots than to have a greater number of under strength squadrons in his Group. Some of his squadrons were doing fifty hours flying a day and while they were flying their airfields were being bombed. While on the ground they could not get proper meals or rest.

Douglas, who had still failed to grasp what was being said, suggested another OTU. Evill pointed out that this would have to be done very quickly to make a difference. Dowding pointed out that such a unit would itself be a drain on his resources.

Park now described his scheme for sector training flights. Pilots from the OTUs were not fit to fight, until they received extra training, traditionally done at their squadrons. Training flights had now been cancelled because all experienced pilots were needed for the fighting and all stations were dispersed because of the bombing. He proposed that pilots from OTUs should go to squadrons in the north for further training and that squadrons in the south should receive only fully trained men from the north to fill their gaps. This was the basis of the so called ‘stabilisation system’.

Dowding argued that he must always have some fresh operational squadrons to exchange for 11 Group’s most badly hit squadrons.

Park agreed that the two schemes could run in parallel.

The next day Nicholl informed all the Group commanders that squadrons were to be divided into three classes. Class A squadrons, all those in 11 Group, were to be maintained at a minimum strength of 16 operational pilots. Some in Nos 10 and 12 Groups were similarly designated, though not all 16 pilots had to be operational. Class B squadrons could include up to 6 non-operational pilots to be trained on the job. Class C squadrons might retain a minimum of 3 operational pilots, just one section, rendering these entire squadrons effectively non-operational training units, something to be borne in mind when looking at raw pilot/squadron numbers. Evill hoped that Class C squadrons might produce as many as five operational pilots every week.

This scheme remained in place until November. It was a desperate measure and a reflection of how serious the shortage of operational pilots was at this time.

 

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

PART 2 – THE GERMAN PLAN

Goering and his staff had spent the last 24 hours drawing up a plan for the first day of this new phase of the Battle.

1. On the evening of 7 September, Luftflotte 2 will carry out a major operation against target ‘A’ Loge [London]

2. The attack will take place in the following stages:

18:00: initial attack to be carried out by Fliegerkorps II using one Kampfgeschwader;

18:40: main attack to be carried out by Fliegerkorps II, using the remaining Kampfgeschwaders;

19:00: Fliegerkorps I shall attack, using KG 30

21:00: 9. Fliegerdivision shall attack, using all available aircraft.

3.Fighters and escort:

a) The initial attack will draw most of the British fighters into the air, so that they will have left the area when the main attack takes place.

b) Jafü 2 is responsible for the escort, using one Jagdgeschwader per Kampfgeschwader.

c) From 18:40 ZG 76 will clear the air of British fighters in the target areas assigned to Fliegerkorps I and shall protect the bomber formations’ approach and return flights.

d) Jafü 2 shall assign two Jagdgeschwader to meet the units from I. and II. Fliegerkorps when they return from their attacks.

4. Implementation:

a) Bomber units will meet the fighters during flight over the coast. The fighters shall avoid weaving unnecessarily.

b) The approach route is to be determined in consultation between the air corps and Jafü 2.

c) Regarding the escort of units subordinate to Jafü 2: As the fighter aircraft are flying to the limit of their range, every detour is to be avoided and the approach must be done at the highest possible airspeed.

d) Flight altitude after meeting with fighter aircraft: between 5,000 and 6,500 metres. By using vertical separation, the length of formations is to be kept down as much as possible. The return flight shall be carried out in a shallow dive, so that the English coast is passed at about 4,000 metres altitude.

The details were left, as was the German way, to the individual commanders and their subordinates.

Of note is the altitude at which the formations would arrive, slightly higher than was normal for the bombers.

 

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

PART 3 – THE ACTION.

I cannot possibly cover all the action today in a post of sensible length. Hopefully, I can give a broad overview and an impression of the scale of operations.

Goering’s orders had reached the relevant commands by early afternoon. Having spent the morning touring various Luftwaffe units, he took himself to Cap Gris Nez from where he would watch the evening action.

In England, the day dawned clear and Fighter Command braced itself for further attacks. Nothing happened. A lone reconnaissance aircraft which flew over Liverpool was chased and shot down. No.66 Squadron on a routine patrol was vectored to intercept a small raid, but when it found only fighters it broke away.

Just before 16.00 RDF detected the first signs of a build up over France. The first counters were placed on the situation map at Fighter Command’s HQ at Bentley Priory. Park was still present at this time, 11 Group’s response would be handled by his chief controller, Willoughby de Broke, who brought many of his squadrons to readiness. By far the largest raid of the war to date, and the largest aerial armada ever assembled was taking shape over France. The Luftwaffe had committed 348 bombers and 617 fighters to the assault on Britain’s capital. According to Goering’s instruction this vast formation started across the Channel on a front twenty miles wide. The first Observer Corps reports of ‘many hundreds’ of aircraft reached Maidstone at 16.16. One minute later eleven of 11 Groups squadrons were scrambled, and any remaining were brought to readiness. Nos. 10 and 12 Groups were given notice that they might be required to help.

Once across the coast the Luftwaffe formation split up and the Observer Corps struggled to track the huge number of aircraft. One large group was heading north, towards the Essex coast, threatening North Weald and other 12 Group airfields, which the British assumed to be its target. Another group, estimated at 200 bombers plus escort, seemed to be heading for Biggin Hill and Kenley. A third Group seemed to be heading from the coast in the general direction of London. Fighter Command had quite reasonably reacted to a threat to its airfields, given events of the past week or so. It was only when the first group of bombers suddenly swung west and headed directly up the Thames, and the second group by passed the sector stations, passed over central London and then swung towards the east End that the real target was revealed. All Fighter Command’s airborne squadrons were ordered to leave their patrols and head for the capital. They had been caught on the hop, in the wrong place, for once. There is a terrible irony in this. Fighter Command and its predecessor, Air Defence of Great Britain had to a large extent been designed to protect London. Inter-war exercises concentrated on this. The doomsday literature of the inter-war years foresaw major cities deluged with explosives and poison gas. After a year of war none of it had happened, and when it did the instrument supposed to prevent it was caught out. When the first bombs fell, there were 23 British squadrons airborne, all frantically trying to get to the capital.

The first four squadrons to have scrambled, Nos 1 and 303 (Polish) from Northolt, No 504 from Hendon and No 501 from Gravesend were closest, patrolling their airfields and the Thameshaven depot. They were the first to intercept. No. 249 entered the fray over Maidstone but was quickly surrounded by up to sixty Bf 109s. Six Hurricanes were shot down. No 303 ran into some bombers over Essex, S/Ldr Ronald Kellet gave this account.

“We gave them all we’d got opening fire at 450 yards and only breaking away when we could see the enemy completely filling the gunsight. That means we finished the attack at point blank range. We went in practically in one straight line, all of us blazing away.”

Nos. 1 and 63 Squadrons also made interceptions but struggled to breach the fighter screens. No.43 Squadron attacked the formation. A British report noted.

“43 Squadron encountered three enemy formations roughly 20 miles apart. Each formation consisted of 20-25 Do 17 at 15,000 feet with 12-15 Me 110s circling over them at 17,000 feet and 25 Me 109s, Me 110s and possibly He 113s stepped up to 22,000 feet. In the ensuing dogfight it was noticed that when attacked the bombers kept straight on their course whilst the Me 110s dived down to keep off the attacking fighters.”

The true scale of the formation could not be seen by individual units. Francis Mason wrote of the British fighters arriving over London that

“They found themselves on the edge of a tidal wave of aircraft, towering above them, rank upon rank, more than a mile and a half high, covering the sky like some vast irresistible migration.”

S/Ldr ‘Sandy’ Johnstone of No 602 Squadron.

“All we could see was row upon row of German raiders, all heading for London. I have never seen so many aircraft in the air all at the same time. The escorting fighters saw us at once and came down like a ton of bricks, when the squadron split up and the sky became a seething cauldron of aeroplanes, swooping and swerving in and out of the vapour trails and tracer smoke. A Hurricane on fire spun out of control ahead of me while, above to my right, a 110 flashed across my vision and disappeared into the fog of battle before I could draw a bead on it. Everyone was shouting and the earphones became filled with a meaningless cacophony of jumbled noises. Everything became a maelstrom of jumbled impression – a Dornier spinning with part of its port mainplane missing; black streaks of tracer ahead, when I instinctively put my arm up to shield my face; taking a breather when the haze absorbed me for a minute…”

16.43: In London the air raid alarms sounded. At first people were reluctant to head for the shelters, particularly at Upton Park, where West Ham were leading Spurs 4-1, but soon the sound of aircraft and then the sight of the large formations served as an incentive to get people moving.

17:15: The first wave dropped its bombs on Woolwich Arsenal and two large factories. The bombers then turned to the right, away from the fires that started down below where their bombs had exploded. The following waves continued further west and dropped their bombs on both sides of the Thames just where it forms two large loops, where the docks were concentrated. Here the Germans for the first time used 1.5-ton sea mines against the city, as a kind of blockbuster. The greater part of the 300 tons of high-explosive bombs and thousands of incendiary bombs that fell on London that afternoon, was directed against four specific targets: the Victoria and Albert docks, the West India docks and the Surrey Commercial docks. Over three hundred German bombers had dropped their bombs and turned away so as to not get in the way for the next wave. The slum areas of London’s East End were badly hit. 400 Londoners were killed and many thousand were wounded.

As the German formations withdrew, they were harassed by many of Fighter Command's squadrons, including those sent from other Groups, arriving too late to interfere with the bombing. Units like No 234 and 609 Squadrons, both from Middle Wallop in 10 Group made interceptions south of London. The air combats spread out over an area of 25,000 square kilometres.

Some of the Luftwaffe’s Bf 109s had been forced to withdraw, short of fuel, but some of Fighter Command’s aircraft also needed to land and re-fuel. A call had been sent to 12 Group which dispatched its ‘Big Wing’ of Nos 19 (Spitfire) and 242 and 310 Squadrons. It took far too long to assemble, and over the Isle of Sheppey, with No 19 Squadron about 3,000 feet above the two Hurricane squadrons, No 242 was bounced by Bf 109s losing two aircraft. This was not the resounding success that Bader would pretend, and he complained that he was scrambled too late. Everyone thought that they were scrambled too late, but the facts were that it took too long to assemble the Wing and it never had time to achieve sufficient altitude en route to an interception. This would become an issue beyond the scope of this diary, suffice to say that after today’s events, attitudes hardened.

18.15: The ‘All Clear’ sounded in London. There were nine miles of waterfront ablaze. Fire crews were called in from as far afield as Coventry. The destruction was on a level not previously seen in Britain.

 

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

PART 4 - THE AFTERMATH

British propaganda at the time and to a certain extent post war British accounts played down the German success. All the German bombers had managed to drop their bombs on their targets without being significantly disturbed by either fighter or anti-aircraft fire. The air fighting had also been a new hard blow to Fighter Command. No German formations had been driven back and the British had suffered severe losses. Of the 268 Spitfires and Hurricanes in contact with the enemy, 44 had been shot down and of these, 25 were total losses. Of the German aircraft that took part in the attack, 26 were lost, which is less than three per cent. The German bomber units had done best, their average losses amounted to a mere two per cent, or a total of 7 aircraft. Helmut Staal of II./KG 76 flew in the leading formation of bombers today.

“It had been an easy flight up from the Thames Estuary and along the Thames. There was no opposition and we felt that we had the whole sky to ourselves. We were at 5000 feet*. The docks at Woolwich stood out almost as if beckoning for us to release our bomb load. Through the glass canopy I could see the tall cranes and the long square shape of the three main docks. I lined them up carefully, and as I pressed the release button I looked elsewhere at the huge mass of buildings and warehouses below, then just caught a glimpse of the sticks of bombs as they kinked from side to side as they fell towards earth.”

*This must be a mistranslation or typo in my source. I believe it should read 5,000 metres, but I’ve left it as I found it.



From a German perspective, the day could scarcely have gone better and tonight Luftflotte 3 would return, more than 200 bombers dropped a continuous steam of high explosives and incendiary bombs into the blazing docklands from 20.00 until almost 05.00 on the morning of the 8th. American journalist Ben Robertson watched on, appalled, from high ground south of the city and reported,

“The most appalling and depressing sight any of us had ever seen. It made us almost physically ill to see the enormity of the flames that lit the entire western sky. The London that we knew was burning, the London which had taken thirty generations of men a thousand years to build, and the Nazis had done that in thirty seconds.”

So why did Keith Park reckon this to be the decisive day in the Battle of Britain? Park never considered that to be the 15th, which we now remember as Battle of Britain Day. Park knew how stretched his Group was and the parlous state of Fighter Command in early September. He knew that a switch from attacking his airfields and other infrastructure would allow him time to re-group and re-build. It was a terrible thing to see London burning, Park flew over the inferno in his personal Hurricane to see first-hand the devastation. He had returned to Uxbridge from Bentley Priory just as the last of the bombers made their attacks and had then driven to Northolt where his Hurricane was parked. He would later say,

“It was burning all down the river. It was a horrid sight, but I looked down and said, “Thank God for that”, because I realised that the methodical Germans had at last switched their attack from my vital aerodromes on to cities.”

In Park’s view, which never changed, it was today that the Germans had thrown away any chance of victory. They had unquestionably achieved a success today, but it was a Pyrrhic victory.

Not everyone was so sure at the time. At about the same time as the Luftwaffe’s bombers turned and dived for home the Joint Chiefs of Staff met to assess the situation facing the UK. Having weighed the evidence they concluded that an invasion was imminent. All forces in the UK were ordered to ‘stand by at immediate notice’. General Headquarters, Home Forces, on their own initiative issued at 20.07 the codeword ‘Cromwell’, to bring all their forces to ‘immediate action’. Many thought that this meant that the invasion was already underway. It was not, but the situation seemed grim.