Saturday 31 August.
The good weather continues with a clear and sunny day.
The Luftwaffe used the good weather to maintain its pressure on Fighter Command.
An RAF Intelligence Summary described the current Luftwaffe tactics. They were what Goering wanted, none of the nonsense about all the fighters providing a close escort, or Bf 110s having themselves to be escorted.
“The Germans resumed heavy fighter escorts, formations of up to 100 Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Messerschmitt Bf 110 being reported. When both these types of fighters are escorting bombers, it is general for the Bf 110 to be level with or just above the bombers at 15,000 ft with Messerschmitt Bf 109 stepped up behind to 20,000 ft. In another case thirty Dornier Do 17 were in vics of ten line astern stepped up from 15,000 to 15,500 ft with forty Bf 110 level with the last vic and on the right, left and behind it, and a considerable number of Messerschmitt Bf 109s at 25,000 ft behind them.”
The first action of the day was an attack on Debden. At 07.30 three squadrons were scrambled to patrol the Kent coast, Nos 1, 253 and 501. As the plots developed it became clear that a very large force made up of five formations, two of 30 Do 17s and others of a total of 120 Bf 109s and 60 f 110s were approaching targets inland. Another six squadrons, Nos 111, 19, 56, 222, 257 and 601 were dispatched. Debden was bombed at 08.00 and 08.20. Though one of the Luftwaffe targets was Duxford, III./KG 2 either bombed the wrong airfield or dumped their bombs in countryside when attacked by No. 111 Squadron, depending which version you believe (I think that at least some of them bombed Debden, because 19 aircraft reported bombing Duxford, which was not bombed). The RAF had for once come off badly in the exchanges, losing 12 fighters. The Luftwaffe had lost just 5 aircraft and none of the bombers were shot down.
At 08.50, as the previous raid withdrew a large number of fighters, 125 Bf 109s, swept over Kent, presumably to distract Fighter Command from the retreating raids. A formation of 6 Bf 109s shot down all 23 balloons of the Dover Barrage. There were skirmishes with Nos 603, 616, 79 and 1 (RCAF) Squadrons. Three of the still inexperienced Canadians were shot down. One Bf 109 was also shot down.
Between 10.00 and 10.45 numerous plots were made in the Dover Straits but did not cross the English coast. Finally, one crossed at Folkestone, headed towards Chatham. Nos 151 and 17 Squadrons were scrambled as various other raids were plotted by the Observer Corps across Kent and Essex. 151 Squadron tangled with a formation of Bf 109s and P/O Czajkowski was shot down and badly wounded. The Luftwaffe suffered no casualties.
At 12.30 two large raids crossed the coast at Folkestone. 11 Group controllers guessed that they were heading for Biggin Hill and Kenley and scrambled nine squadrons, Nos 79, 253, 17, 603, 616, 222, 85, 501 and 601. Some of these units were making a third scramble before lunch. By 12.50 the raids were approaching Croydon, where they were intercepted by No 79 Squadron. As they attempted to fight through to the Ju 88s the Bf 110s of Eprg 210 slipped in and bombed Croydon airfield. Today Ernst Glaeske who had a lucky escape a few days ago when he formated on a Spitfire, would run out of luck. He was shot down in Eprg 210’s attack on Croydon, making a good belly landing with Konrad Schweda, his wireless operator, wounded. He told his interrogators that he landed in the hope that Schweda’s life might be saved, but sadly this was not to be.
Between 13.00 and 13.10 a further three raids crossed the coast and four more squadrons, Nos 1, 151, 310 and 54 were scrambled. These raids made their way towards Hornchurch. Just before they reached their target, they were attacked by 40 Hurricanes of Nos 151, 501, 310 and 601 Squadrons. The escorting Bf 109s and Bf 110s withdrew towards Colchester, drawing off many of the British fighters, but 310 got to the bombers. More than 100 bombs fell on Hornchurch, destroying 4 of No 54 Squadron’s Spitfires and disrupting services, operations were not affected. Three of the destroyed Spitfires were in the act of taking off, another event referenced in that film. Including the four on the ground the RAF had lost another 12 fighters. The Luftwaffe had lost 10 aircraft including 4 bombers.
During the afternoon the Luftwaffe flew reconnaissance sorties over England. One of these aircraft, a Do 215 of 4./Aufklarungs Gruppe Ob.d.l was shot down into the sea by three Spitfires of No 66 Squadron at 15.00, off the Norfolk coast.
From 17.00 enemy formations were plotted once again, assembling over France. At 17.30 five raids totalling 100+ were moving across the Channel. Nos. 79 (which could only field 7 Hurricanes), 54 (9 Spitfires), 85 (10 Hurricanes), 222 (10 Spitfires) and 603 (which managed 13 Spitfires) were scrambled. All except 603 were under strength. 30 Do 17s with an escort of 100 Bf 19s and Bf 110s were engaged in a running battle by the first four squadrons from Maidstone to Purfleet. Maidstone was bombed at 18.00 and then Rainham and Hornchurch at 18.10, just as No 603 Squadron took off. The Hornchurch Operations Record Book noted
“This time, however, their aim was most inaccurate, and the line of bombs fell from them towards then edge of the aerodrome. Two Spitfires parked near the edge of the aerodrome were written off, and one airman was killed. Otherwise, apart from damage to dispersal pens, the perimeter track, and the aerodrome surface, the raid was abortive, and the aerodrome remained serviceable.”
As Hornchurch was being bombed, two more raids crossed the coast and were thought to be headed towards Biggin Hill and Kenley. Between 17.35 and 18.00 no less than thirteen squadrons were scrambled, Nos. 1(RCAF), 17, 616, 72, 501, 1, 253, 242, 611, 257, 609, 602 and 303 all took off…again. Only four of these squadrons could field a full complement of 12 aircraft. No 72 engaged first, near Dungeness, followed by 17 and 602 over Maidstone. No 79 engaged near Biggin Hill and finally No 303 as the raid retired. Biggin Hill was hit by over 100 bombs. The Operations Room was set on fire, telephone lines cut, and many buildings destroyed or damaged. This too is referenced in that film. The Emergency Operation Room, located off the airfield was brought into use. Biggin Hill was all but unserviceable and two of its three squadrons moved elsewhere. The RAF had lost 10 more fighters. The Luftwaffe had lost 10 aircraft, all fighters.
The Luftwaffe had made a maximum effort today. Today the RAF had lost 37 aircraft with 9 pilots killed and another 18 wounded. The Luftwaffe had lost 39 aircraft. The margins were narrowing.
As August came to a close it was hard to see who was winning. The RAF was running out of operational pilots, but the Luftwaffe was mystified as to where the seemingly endless supply of RAF fighters was coming from. The German intelligence assessments were far from the reality. On September 5 an intelligence assessment estimated that they had destroyed 1,334 RAF aircraft, which was both optimistic and nowhere near enough anyway, given their own losses.
The real figures for losses this month were more favourable to the British, who had lost 211 Hurricanes and 113 Spitfires, 324 of their frontline fighters, with another 84 damaged. Also lost were 13 Blenheims and 7 Defiants. Total Fighter Command losses amounted to 344 aircraft this month. More worrying was the loss of the 139 pilots killed, with another 110 wounded and just 7 listed as missing.
The Germans had lost 217 Bf 109s and 119 Bf 110s, 336 of its frontline fighters with another 95 damaged, and was doing slightly worse than the RAF in fighter vs fighter combat at this stage of the Battle. They had also lost 71 Do 17s, 89 He 111s and 89 Ju 88s, 249 of their medium bombers, with a further 78 damaged. Also lost were 57 Ju 87 dive bombers. Total Luftwaffe losses amounted to 669 aircraft this month. A heavy toll was taken on the Luftwaffe aircrew, 463 had been killed, 201 wounded and a staggering 804 were missing, many of whom were PoWs in Britain.
If neither side was sure who was winning, it was the German leadership which was most confident. There was a feeling on both sides that matters would be decided in the coming days.