Great work again chaps.
Battle of Britain diary
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stona
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Sunday 11 August
Clear skies. A high pressure area in the Atlantic indicates fine weather for the next few days.
This is the day that the Battle of Britain really began, and it is not yet ‘Adlertag’. It is impossible to give detailed accounts of the action now, as it would fill pages.
From 10.15 a large raid, 38 Ju 88s with an enormous escort of at least 40 Bf 109s and 60 Bf 110s was intercepted off Portland. This was by far the largest confrontation between the two air forces to date, and fighting raged for almost an hour. At the end of it the Luftwaffe had lost 11 Bf 109s, 6 Ju 88s and 6 Bf 110s. Clearly the British were not sporting enough to go along with the German master plan for the Battle, which was essentially to be lured into combat and shot down by the Luftwaffe’s ‘experten’. There was a price paid by the RAF, 16 Hurricanes were lost
In the South East the day started with Luftwaffe fighter sweeps, that were met with superior British numbers. By 11.15 three Spitfires had been lost for one Bf 109 and an He 59.
Around midday a really big action took place over Convoy Booty in the Thames estuary. Four Bf 110s of Eprg 210 had gone down into the sea, the British lost a Hurricane and two Spitfires.
At about 13.40 another battle began between a large raid comprising 40 Do 17s and 10 Ju 87s escorted by at least 20 Bf 109s from JG 51 and JG 3. No.111 Squadron sent 12 Hurricanes and No. 74 Squadron 6 Spitfires. It was a bad day for 111 Squadron, which lost 4 Hurricanes and all their pilots. The Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s and a Ju 87, various others were damaged.
This was the first day of a battle of attrition. The Luftwaffe had lost or written off 38 aircraft with another 16 damaged, but the RAF had lost 27 fighters and another 18 damaged (with 25 of the pilots killed).
The problem for the Germans, though the British had no way of appreciating this, was that if this continued for the next five weeks, during which the preparations for Sealion were to be made, The Luftwaffe would lose.
Theo Osterkamp seems to have been the only Luftwaffe commander who actually bothered to do some sums. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two complete Geschwader (almost 150 aircraft) over the beach head at all times. By his maths this would require a strength of 12 Geschwader, almost 900 aircraft, more than the Luftwaffe started the Battle with. This implied that they could not sustain any net losses at all. This meant that a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, say 75 aircraft, was the maximum acceptable. He further calculated that within these constraints and in order to reduce Fighter Command's strength by 50% the Luftwaffe fighters would have to achieve an exchange rate of 5:1. This was in fact the target he set JG 51 when it took up its position on the Channel coast in early July. He ordered his pilots only to attack when a tactical advantage assured them of success with minimal risk. At least Osterkamp had bothered to do the sums. The problem was that the Luftwaffe could never shoot down something like 100 British fighters a week without taking risks. If the British lost 100 fighters in five weeks, to the Germans 20, achieving a 5:1 exchange rate, they would still be able to fight over the beaches and the Luftwaffe would have failed. Essentially, the German plan was dependent on the British committing large numbers of fighters to large air battles, allowing themselves to be bounced and shot down by the Luftwaffe's aces in their Bf 109s. Further raids would then be made on British airfields to mop up anything that was left. Unsurprisingly, the British did not oblige and events today, before the official ‘Adlertag’ clearly showed the scale of the problem the Germans faced.
Clear skies. A high pressure area in the Atlantic indicates fine weather for the next few days.
This is the day that the Battle of Britain really began, and it is not yet ‘Adlertag’. It is impossible to give detailed accounts of the action now, as it would fill pages.
From 10.15 a large raid, 38 Ju 88s with an enormous escort of at least 40 Bf 109s and 60 Bf 110s was intercepted off Portland. This was by far the largest confrontation between the two air forces to date, and fighting raged for almost an hour. At the end of it the Luftwaffe had lost 11 Bf 109s, 6 Ju 88s and 6 Bf 110s. Clearly the British were not sporting enough to go along with the German master plan for the Battle, which was essentially to be lured into combat and shot down by the Luftwaffe’s ‘experten’. There was a price paid by the RAF, 16 Hurricanes were lost
In the South East the day started with Luftwaffe fighter sweeps, that were met with superior British numbers. By 11.15 three Spitfires had been lost for one Bf 109 and an He 59.
Around midday a really big action took place over Convoy Booty in the Thames estuary. Four Bf 110s of Eprg 210 had gone down into the sea, the British lost a Hurricane and two Spitfires.
At about 13.40 another battle began between a large raid comprising 40 Do 17s and 10 Ju 87s escorted by at least 20 Bf 109s from JG 51 and JG 3. No.111 Squadron sent 12 Hurricanes and No. 74 Squadron 6 Spitfires. It was a bad day for 111 Squadron, which lost 4 Hurricanes and all their pilots. The Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s and a Ju 87, various others were damaged.
This was the first day of a battle of attrition. The Luftwaffe had lost or written off 38 aircraft with another 16 damaged, but the RAF had lost 27 fighters and another 18 damaged (with 25 of the pilots killed).
The problem for the Germans, though the British had no way of appreciating this, was that if this continued for the next five weeks, during which the preparations for Sealion were to be made, The Luftwaffe would lose.
Theo Osterkamp seems to have been the only Luftwaffe commander who actually bothered to do some sums. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two complete Geschwader (almost 150 aircraft) over the beach head at all times. By his maths this would require a strength of 12 Geschwader, almost 900 aircraft, more than the Luftwaffe started the Battle with. This implied that they could not sustain any net losses at all. This meant that a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, say 75 aircraft, was the maximum acceptable. He further calculated that within these constraints and in order to reduce Fighter Command's strength by 50% the Luftwaffe fighters would have to achieve an exchange rate of 5:1. This was in fact the target he set JG 51 when it took up its position on the Channel coast in early July. He ordered his pilots only to attack when a tactical advantage assured them of success with minimal risk. At least Osterkamp had bothered to do the sums. The problem was that the Luftwaffe could never shoot down something like 100 British fighters a week without taking risks. If the British lost 100 fighters in five weeks, to the Germans 20, achieving a 5:1 exchange rate, they would still be able to fight over the beaches and the Luftwaffe would have failed. Essentially, the German plan was dependent on the British committing large numbers of fighters to large air battles, allowing themselves to be bounced and shot down by the Luftwaffe's aces in their Bf 109s. Further raids would then be made on British airfields to mop up anything that was left. Unsurprisingly, the British did not oblige and events today, before the official ‘Adlertag’ clearly showed the scale of the problem the Germans faced.
Really interesting. I seem to remember reading that the Germans were not really training replacement pilots at this time, especially bomber pilots, so losses impacted on them disproportionately. Was this the case or am I dreaming as usual? 
stona
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Really interesting. I seem to remember reading that the Germans were not really training replacement pilots at this time, especially bomber pilots, so losses impacted on them disproportionately. Was this the case or am I dreaming as usual?
The German training schools were still operating at capacity throughout this period, they would not be severely impacted by fuel and other shortages until after Barbarossa, particularly in 1942. The problem was that the capacity was far too low. There was nothing in any German planning before the war that prepared them for a long haul or the level of losses suffered in 1939/40. At this time the standard training for a fighter pilot, through the various schools, took at least 18 months.
We tend to see the Battle of Britain in isolation, as a campaign that ran through the summer and autumn of 1940, but it was no such thing for the Luftwaffe. It was a continuation of the campaigns in Poland and then western Europe, with only the brief pause of the 'phoney war' (Sitzkrieg). The Luftwaffe had lost more than 1,400 aircraft to all causes in May-June 1940, 28% of its total strength, and a corresponding number of highly trained aircrew. It had not made up its significant personnel losses when it started what we call the Battle of Britain.
The Battle of Britain compounded these already significant losses.
The Luftwaffe bombers started with just 75% of operational ready crews against establishment in July 1940 and this fell to just 59% by September. Bomber crews required considerably longer training to operate multi engine types and also were typically qualified in night and instrument flying, unlike their fighter colleagues, most of whom were not qualified for either. They were consequently in very short supply.
The Bf 110 force started with 84% operational ready crews, but their losses saw this fall to 64%, a reflection of the mis-use of the type as a bomber escort and its vulnerability to single seat fighters. It is a myth that the Bf 110s were themselves escorted by Bf 109s, with the exception of those operating as fighter-bombers, in which role they were sometimes effective. They would be very effective in this role on the eastern front in the coming years.
For the Bf 109s the numbers are 81% and 77% a reflection of both the quality of the aircraft and its pilots and that it was not the target for British fighters. Park emphasised on several occasions, beginning with his conference with his squadron commanders at Northolt on 14th June to discuss air fighting tactics, that the aim was the destruction of enemy bombers and that any action against fighters was only a means to this end.
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My records show fifty-four Ju88 from I. & II./KG54, twenty He111 from KG27, sixty-one Bf110 from ZG2 and thirty Bf109 from JG2. Bf109 from JG27 would turn up later.
Forty-two allied fighters from five squadrons were scrambled to meet the raid, with 11 Group sending a further thirty-two Hurricanes from three squadrons to assist them.
These were Bf109 and Bf110 from Erpobungsgruppe 210
Bf110 from Erpobungsgruppe 210 and ZG26 with Ju88 from KG2 attacked 'Booty'.
17, 74 and 85 Squadrons in turn attacked the raiders.
The raid was against a convoy in the Thames estuary. 111 Sqn also lost one more Hurricane , crash landing (written off) when he ran out of fuel.
The level of detail you two have come up with is nothing short of astounding. Again, brilliant work gentlemen.
stona
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Glad you (and hopefully others) are enjoying it. I know i certainly am.
I just looked ahead to the 15th (Black Thursday for the Luftwaffe). Bloody Hell! I'm not sure how I can keep that within sensible proportions. I think the level of detail will suffer in an effort to get it all in.
It's also worth remembering that the RAF had a significant logistical advantage in fighting largely over their home territory. Aircrew who bailed out, or made forced landings, had a pretty good chance of returning to action, whereas Axis aircrew shot down over Britain would become POWs.
Pete
stona
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Monday 12 August
A fine day.
General Martini understood the RDF (radar) stations on the British coast were part of an early warning system, though he had no idea how the system worked, and had suggested that they be attacked as a precursor to major operations against England. Today is the day that several were attacked in preparation for ‘Adlertag’ the launching of ‘Operation Eagle Attack’ to destroy the RAF and lay the groundwork for an invasion of Britain..
I have one reference which alone covers the day’s events in about 60 pages, obviously I can’t reproduce that sort of detail here!
I will divide the action into two areas, Kent and its Channel coast and then west, meaning principally the area of the Isle of Wight.
KENT:
1) 08.15 the first German raids are met. They comprised 60 bombers with a similar number of escorts. No.610 Squadron engaged one of the ‘small’ plots and 12 Spitfires tangled with 12 Bf 109s from 3./JG 26. 9 Do 17s got through to bomb Lympne airfield. 54 Squadron split to engage two large formations over Dover and North Foreland. The Bf 110s of Eprg 210 sneaked in to bomb the RDF stations at Dunkirk (near Canterbury), Pevensey, Rye and Dover and were not intercepted. Despite the numbers, just 1 Spitfire and 1 Bf 109 were shot down
2) 11.25 and another raid comes in, this time about 30 Ju 87s escorted by 20 Bf 109s attempted to attack a convoy off the Essex coast. 65 Squadron had a Flight patrolling Hawkinge while 501 Squadron was sent from Hawkinge to North Foreland. Just 3 Hurricanes of 151 Squadron were patrolling the convoy. Nos. 65 and 501 Squadrons were ordered to intercept the attacks, and Nos. 54 and 111 Squadrons were scrambled. The attack was beaten back, though two minesweepers were damaged. The RAF lose 2 Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe a Bf 109 and a Ju 87.
3) 12.50 another large raid, 30 bombers and 40 Bf 110s escorted by 30 Bf 109s arrives, heading for Manston. The only Fighter Command squadrons airborne were 501, patrolling Dover and 615 on its way from Kenley to Beachy Head. As the raid developed 65 Squadron was scrambled from Manston, 56 from Rochford and 610 from Biggin Hill. The Luftwaffe would catch No. 65 Squadron on the ground, at least in part due to gaps in Chain Home coverage caused by earlier raids. The RAF lost 1 Hurricane, flown by Polish advanced flying instructor Kazimierz Lukaszewicz, who was killed. The Luftwaffe lost 3 Bf 109s.
4) 17.30 and the Luftwaffe returns in force. 100 bombers, with at least 150 Bf 109s and a few Bf 110s make for Lympne and Manston again. This is the size of raid we all imagine, probably due to a certain 1960s film! The British put up about 50 fighters to intercept the raid. Nos. 54 and 56 Squadrons attacked 39 Do 17s of KG 2 escorted by 30 Bf 109s and broke up the raid. The bombing was scattered in an area SE of Canterbury. No. 32 Squadron attacked a raid as it crossed the coast at Dover but were fended off by a large Bf 109 escort. Eprg 210 were back, they sneaked in an bombed Hawkinge, No. 501 Squadron had just taken off when they arrived. A final formation made for Lympne again. This comprised more than 50 Do 17s of KG 2 and Bf 109s of JG 26. It was intercepted by No. 64 Squadron who tried to break up the formation. About 200 bombs fell on the airfield which was severely damaged. The British lost 2 Hurricanes and a Spitfire, the Germans 2 Bf 109s, another 2 were written off having staggered back to France.
WEST:
5) 11.50 and a huge raid, detected by the Chain Home station at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight, arrives. CH Ventnor initially plotted two formations of 30+ with two smaller formations orbiting off the Cherbourg Peninsular. At 11.40, as the plots became better defined, a raid of 150+ was plotted approaching the Isle of Wight and another 30+ raid slightly further east. Between 11.40 and 12.00 Nos. 257, 266, 152, 609 and 213 Squadrons are scrambled, Nos 257 and 266, already airborne are re-directed to the Isle of Wight. At 12.10 Nos. 145 and 43 Squadrons are scrambled, just as Ventnor was bombed. The fighting took place in defence of Ventnor and Portsmouth. The RAF lost 8 fighters, the Luftwaffe lost 1 Bf 109, but fighters were not the primary targets for the RAF. Also lost were 10 Ju 88s, the newest and best of their bombers, and 5 Bf 110s. Many more aircraft were damaged, on both sides.
When the dust settled the Luftwaffe had lost 25 aircraft in combat today, with a further 14 damaged (at least two written off). The RAF had lost or written off 18 aircraft with another 21 damaged. The margin is not large, but it is nothing like the 5:1 that the Luftwaffe required. To achieve that it would have to have shot down more than 100 British fighters today!
This morning the Luftwaffe managed to put off air three Chain Home (or Chain Home Low) stations, Dover, Pevensey and Rye. That at Dunkirk was also hit, but not badly damaged. It was through the gap created that bombers made their way to Lympne and Hawkinge, both of which were bombed. The later attack on Ventnor was devastating. The aerials were damaged and every building on the site destroyed or damaged. The station was off air until the 15th and then came back in a limited capacity. The Germans never understood their success and did not come back and repeatedly attack the sites as they should have. Only Ventnor was attacked again, and put off air until the end of September. They concluded that the stations could at best be shut down for brief periods and that their ancillary equipment was housed underground in bomb proof bunkers. It wasn’t, it was above ground in nothing more than sheds. The electricity supply and telephone lines to the stations were also vulnerable. It was one of the great ‘dropped balls’ of the Luftwaffe campaign
A fine day.
General Martini understood the RDF (radar) stations on the British coast were part of an early warning system, though he had no idea how the system worked, and had suggested that they be attacked as a precursor to major operations against England. Today is the day that several were attacked in preparation for ‘Adlertag’ the launching of ‘Operation Eagle Attack’ to destroy the RAF and lay the groundwork for an invasion of Britain..
I have one reference which alone covers the day’s events in about 60 pages, obviously I can’t reproduce that sort of detail here!
I will divide the action into two areas, Kent and its Channel coast and then west, meaning principally the area of the Isle of Wight.
KENT:
1) 08.15 the first German raids are met. They comprised 60 bombers with a similar number of escorts. No.610 Squadron engaged one of the ‘small’ plots and 12 Spitfires tangled with 12 Bf 109s from 3./JG 26. 9 Do 17s got through to bomb Lympne airfield. 54 Squadron split to engage two large formations over Dover and North Foreland. The Bf 110s of Eprg 210 sneaked in to bomb the RDF stations at Dunkirk (near Canterbury), Pevensey, Rye and Dover and were not intercepted. Despite the numbers, just 1 Spitfire and 1 Bf 109 were shot down
2) 11.25 and another raid comes in, this time about 30 Ju 87s escorted by 20 Bf 109s attempted to attack a convoy off the Essex coast. 65 Squadron had a Flight patrolling Hawkinge while 501 Squadron was sent from Hawkinge to North Foreland. Just 3 Hurricanes of 151 Squadron were patrolling the convoy. Nos. 65 and 501 Squadrons were ordered to intercept the attacks, and Nos. 54 and 111 Squadrons were scrambled. The attack was beaten back, though two minesweepers were damaged. The RAF lose 2 Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe a Bf 109 and a Ju 87.
3) 12.50 another large raid, 30 bombers and 40 Bf 110s escorted by 30 Bf 109s arrives, heading for Manston. The only Fighter Command squadrons airborne were 501, patrolling Dover and 615 on its way from Kenley to Beachy Head. As the raid developed 65 Squadron was scrambled from Manston, 56 from Rochford and 610 from Biggin Hill. The Luftwaffe would catch No. 65 Squadron on the ground, at least in part due to gaps in Chain Home coverage caused by earlier raids. The RAF lost 1 Hurricane, flown by Polish advanced flying instructor Kazimierz Lukaszewicz, who was killed. The Luftwaffe lost 3 Bf 109s.
4) 17.30 and the Luftwaffe returns in force. 100 bombers, with at least 150 Bf 109s and a few Bf 110s make for Lympne and Manston again. This is the size of raid we all imagine, probably due to a certain 1960s film! The British put up about 50 fighters to intercept the raid. Nos. 54 and 56 Squadrons attacked 39 Do 17s of KG 2 escorted by 30 Bf 109s and broke up the raid. The bombing was scattered in an area SE of Canterbury. No. 32 Squadron attacked a raid as it crossed the coast at Dover but were fended off by a large Bf 109 escort. Eprg 210 were back, they sneaked in an bombed Hawkinge, No. 501 Squadron had just taken off when they arrived. A final formation made for Lympne again. This comprised more than 50 Do 17s of KG 2 and Bf 109s of JG 26. It was intercepted by No. 64 Squadron who tried to break up the formation. About 200 bombs fell on the airfield which was severely damaged. The British lost 2 Hurricanes and a Spitfire, the Germans 2 Bf 109s, another 2 were written off having staggered back to France.
WEST:
5) 11.50 and a huge raid, detected by the Chain Home station at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight, arrives. CH Ventnor initially plotted two formations of 30+ with two smaller formations orbiting off the Cherbourg Peninsular. At 11.40, as the plots became better defined, a raid of 150+ was plotted approaching the Isle of Wight and another 30+ raid slightly further east. Between 11.40 and 12.00 Nos. 257, 266, 152, 609 and 213 Squadrons are scrambled, Nos 257 and 266, already airborne are re-directed to the Isle of Wight. At 12.10 Nos. 145 and 43 Squadrons are scrambled, just as Ventnor was bombed. The fighting took place in defence of Ventnor and Portsmouth. The RAF lost 8 fighters, the Luftwaffe lost 1 Bf 109, but fighters were not the primary targets for the RAF. Also lost were 10 Ju 88s, the newest and best of their bombers, and 5 Bf 110s. Many more aircraft were damaged, on both sides.
When the dust settled the Luftwaffe had lost 25 aircraft in combat today, with a further 14 damaged (at least two written off). The RAF had lost or written off 18 aircraft with another 21 damaged. The margin is not large, but it is nothing like the 5:1 that the Luftwaffe required. To achieve that it would have to have shot down more than 100 British fighters today!
This morning the Luftwaffe managed to put off air three Chain Home (or Chain Home Low) stations, Dover, Pevensey and Rye. That at Dunkirk was also hit, but not badly damaged. It was through the gap created that bombers made their way to Lympne and Hawkinge, both of which were bombed. The later attack on Ventnor was devastating. The aerials were damaged and every building on the site destroyed or damaged. The station was off air until the 15th and then came back in a limited capacity. The Germans never understood their success and did not come back and repeatedly attack the sites as they should have. Only Ventnor was attacked again, and put off air until the end of September. They concluded that the stations could at best be shut down for brief periods and that their ancillary equipment was housed underground in bomb proof bunkers. It wasn’t, it was above ground in nothing more than sheds. The electricity supply and telephone lines to the stations were also vulnerable. It was one of the great ‘dropped balls’ of the Luftwaffe campaign
stona
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Tuesday 13th August
ADLERTAG
Cloudy with drizzle across the country.
The weather rather spoils the German plans for the first day of their all out assault on the RAF. The day begins from a German perspective, with a bit of a farce. The German plan, in simple form, was for large fleets of bombers to attack vital targets in England, forcing British fighters up in their defence, only for them to be swooped on by the high flying escorts and destroyed. This would be followed by later raids, principally directed at airfields, to mop up anything left. The weather meant that the Luftwaffe fighters would not be able to see their charges and Goering hesitated. Operations were to be held back until 14.00, but the message did not arrive in time at all the unit HQs.
KG 2 had already taken off, on its way to bomb RAF Eastchurch (a Coastal Command station, but the Germans didn’t know this). I Gruppe heard a radio message recalling it, but the other two Gruppen did not. The planned escort of Bf 110s from ZG 76 had no communication with the bombers, but attempted to turn them back with some wild manoeuvres in front of the leaders. The bombers took this for high spirits and flew on, the escorts turned back. Oberst Fink was in command of the bombers and later said of the escorts ‘They kept coming up and diving down in a most peculiar way. I thought this was their way of saying they were ready. So I went on and found to my surprise that the fighters didn’t follow’. This was an issue which would dog the German campaign.
The bombers were protected by heavy cloud and the Observer Corps could not plot then accurately after they crossed the coast. Of the five squadrons scrambled to intercept, only No. 74 engaged the bombers before they reached the Isle of Sheppey at about 07.15. The bombers split and headed for Eastchurch and the naval base at Sheerness. As they turned after bombing two more squadrons, Nos. 111 and 151 made interceptions. Five Do 17s were shot down and another seven returned damaged. The RAF lost two Spitfires (one of the pilots was killed) and had another two damaged, along with three damaged Hurricanes.
At about the same time another large raid approached the south coast to the east of the Isle of Wight, roughly on a line from Midhurst to Arundel. It comprised about 40 Ju88s escorted by 20 Bf 110s and 20 Bf 109s. Almost 50 Hurricanes from Nos. 87, 238, 43, 601 and 257 Squadrons with 9 Spitfires from No. 64 Squadron were tasked to the raid. 4 Ju 88s were shot down or failed to return and another 12 returned damaged, several with dead and wounded crewmen. 1 Bf 109 was also shot down. For this the RAF lost 5 Hurricanes.
Shortly before midday a force of about 40 Bf 110s from ZG 2 also jumped the gun. This time it was the escort that set off alone, the Ju 88s of KG 54 never showed up. The Bf 110s were met off Portland by 35 Hurricanes of Nos. 213, 238 and 601 Squadrons. 601 Squadron lost 1 Hurricane and had 2 damaged, but the Luftwaffe lost 4 Bf 110s with another 5 damaged, one of which was written off.
In the afternoon the Luftwaffe returned, this time with better coordinated raids, at roughly the same time.
At 16.00 Two large forces approached the south east. One, comprising about 40 Ju87s escorted by 50 Bf 109s managed to reach Detling, another Coastal Command airfield, un-intercepted, as Spitfires from Nos. 64 and 65 Squadrons were drawn off to intercept a fighter sweep carried out by 30 Bf 109s off Folkestone. The airfield was heavily bombed with significant casualties. 18 Ansons and 5 Blenheims were also destroyed on the ground. The second force made its way along the north Kent coast. The Ju 87s of I./StG 1 were heading for Rochford, those of II./StG 1 were headed for Gravesend. The Bf 110s of Eprg 210 were headed for Southend. Escorts were provided by 30 Bf 109s and more Bf 110s from ZG 26. The weather prevented any concentrated bombing, but elements of the raid were intercepted as it withdrew. The RAF would lose 3 Hurricanes (another made a forced landing) but the Luftwaffe lost 1 Bf 109 with another 4 damaged and 1 Bf 110 with another four damaged, of which one was destroyed in a forced landing in France.
At about the same time more raids approached the south coast, this time between Portland and the Isle of Wight. The largest concentration was of 100 Ju 87s, with 80 Bf 110s and 60 Bf 109s. This was met by 23 Hurricanes of Nos. 213 and 238 Squadrons, 24 Spitfires of Nos. 152 and 609 Squadrons, and 3 Spitfires of No. 92 Squadron. In the ensuing action the RAF would lose 3 Hurricanes and have 2 Spitfires damaged. A certain P/O J C Dundas would make a dead stick landing following damage to his Spitfire. The Luftwaffe lost 4 Bf 109s, 6 Ju 87s and 2 Bf 110s. A second raid, comprising 19 Ju 88s escorted by 30 Bf 109s headed for Southampton and was met by 32 Hurricanes from Nos. 43, 257 and 601 Squadrons. This time the Luftwaffe lost 2 Ju 88s and 2 Bf 110s, another 5 Bf 110s returned damaged, 3 with wounded crew. The RAF suffered only 1 damaged Hurricane.
When the dust settled on ‘Adlertag’ the Luftwaffe had lost 32 aircraft shot down and several others written off. 38 aircraft had returned damaged, many with wounded airmen onboard. The RAF had lost 13 fighters with 3 of their pilots killed (several others were wounded, some badly) and had a further 15 ‘damaged but repairable’. The Luftwaffe’s plan for a 5:1 exchange rate was clearly not working. The first day of the ‘Eagle Attack’ was not and unqualified success for the Luftwaffe and the British defences had for the most part worked as they were intended to do.
The RAF was not just Fighter Command, and today was the day that Bomber Command suffered a disaster in a raid on the airfield at Aalborg in Denmark. Bomber Command decided to send the 12 Blenheims of No. 82 Squadron out to attack the airfield which was occupied by the Germans. The 12 aircraft flew in almost cloudless skies across the North Sea, on reaching the Danish coast one turned back. Due to a navigational error the aircraft made land fall on the southern instead of northern Danish coast, meaning they had to fly almost the entire length of the country to reach their target. 20 miles short of Aalborg, flying at 8,000 feet in a clear sky, they were intercepted by nine Bf 109s which repeatedly attacked the Blenheims until the airfield flak took over. All 11 of the remaining Blenheims were eventually shot down, just 9 of the 33 airmen comprising their crews survived.
ADLERTAG
Cloudy with drizzle across the country.
The weather rather spoils the German plans for the first day of their all out assault on the RAF. The day begins from a German perspective, with a bit of a farce. The German plan, in simple form, was for large fleets of bombers to attack vital targets in England, forcing British fighters up in their defence, only for them to be swooped on by the high flying escorts and destroyed. This would be followed by later raids, principally directed at airfields, to mop up anything left. The weather meant that the Luftwaffe fighters would not be able to see their charges and Goering hesitated. Operations were to be held back until 14.00, but the message did not arrive in time at all the unit HQs.
KG 2 had already taken off, on its way to bomb RAF Eastchurch (a Coastal Command station, but the Germans didn’t know this). I Gruppe heard a radio message recalling it, but the other two Gruppen did not. The planned escort of Bf 110s from ZG 76 had no communication with the bombers, but attempted to turn them back with some wild manoeuvres in front of the leaders. The bombers took this for high spirits and flew on, the escorts turned back. Oberst Fink was in command of the bombers and later said of the escorts ‘They kept coming up and diving down in a most peculiar way. I thought this was their way of saying they were ready. So I went on and found to my surprise that the fighters didn’t follow’. This was an issue which would dog the German campaign.
The bombers were protected by heavy cloud and the Observer Corps could not plot then accurately after they crossed the coast. Of the five squadrons scrambled to intercept, only No. 74 engaged the bombers before they reached the Isle of Sheppey at about 07.15. The bombers split and headed for Eastchurch and the naval base at Sheerness. As they turned after bombing two more squadrons, Nos. 111 and 151 made interceptions. Five Do 17s were shot down and another seven returned damaged. The RAF lost two Spitfires (one of the pilots was killed) and had another two damaged, along with three damaged Hurricanes.
At about the same time another large raid approached the south coast to the east of the Isle of Wight, roughly on a line from Midhurst to Arundel. It comprised about 40 Ju88s escorted by 20 Bf 110s and 20 Bf 109s. Almost 50 Hurricanes from Nos. 87, 238, 43, 601 and 257 Squadrons with 9 Spitfires from No. 64 Squadron were tasked to the raid. 4 Ju 88s were shot down or failed to return and another 12 returned damaged, several with dead and wounded crewmen. 1 Bf 109 was also shot down. For this the RAF lost 5 Hurricanes.
Shortly before midday a force of about 40 Bf 110s from ZG 2 also jumped the gun. This time it was the escort that set off alone, the Ju 88s of KG 54 never showed up. The Bf 110s were met off Portland by 35 Hurricanes of Nos. 213, 238 and 601 Squadrons. 601 Squadron lost 1 Hurricane and had 2 damaged, but the Luftwaffe lost 4 Bf 110s with another 5 damaged, one of which was written off.
In the afternoon the Luftwaffe returned, this time with better coordinated raids, at roughly the same time.
At 16.00 Two large forces approached the south east. One, comprising about 40 Ju87s escorted by 50 Bf 109s managed to reach Detling, another Coastal Command airfield, un-intercepted, as Spitfires from Nos. 64 and 65 Squadrons were drawn off to intercept a fighter sweep carried out by 30 Bf 109s off Folkestone. The airfield was heavily bombed with significant casualties. 18 Ansons and 5 Blenheims were also destroyed on the ground. The second force made its way along the north Kent coast. The Ju 87s of I./StG 1 were heading for Rochford, those of II./StG 1 were headed for Gravesend. The Bf 110s of Eprg 210 were headed for Southend. Escorts were provided by 30 Bf 109s and more Bf 110s from ZG 26. The weather prevented any concentrated bombing, but elements of the raid were intercepted as it withdrew. The RAF would lose 3 Hurricanes (another made a forced landing) but the Luftwaffe lost 1 Bf 109 with another 4 damaged and 1 Bf 110 with another four damaged, of which one was destroyed in a forced landing in France.
At about the same time more raids approached the south coast, this time between Portland and the Isle of Wight. The largest concentration was of 100 Ju 87s, with 80 Bf 110s and 60 Bf 109s. This was met by 23 Hurricanes of Nos. 213 and 238 Squadrons, 24 Spitfires of Nos. 152 and 609 Squadrons, and 3 Spitfires of No. 92 Squadron. In the ensuing action the RAF would lose 3 Hurricanes and have 2 Spitfires damaged. A certain P/O J C Dundas would make a dead stick landing following damage to his Spitfire. The Luftwaffe lost 4 Bf 109s, 6 Ju 87s and 2 Bf 110s. A second raid, comprising 19 Ju 88s escorted by 30 Bf 109s headed for Southampton and was met by 32 Hurricanes from Nos. 43, 257 and 601 Squadrons. This time the Luftwaffe lost 2 Ju 88s and 2 Bf 110s, another 5 Bf 110s returned damaged, 3 with wounded crew. The RAF suffered only 1 damaged Hurricane.
When the dust settled on ‘Adlertag’ the Luftwaffe had lost 32 aircraft shot down and several others written off. 38 aircraft had returned damaged, many with wounded airmen onboard. The RAF had lost 13 fighters with 3 of their pilots killed (several others were wounded, some badly) and had a further 15 ‘damaged but repairable’. The Luftwaffe’s plan for a 5:1 exchange rate was clearly not working. The first day of the ‘Eagle Attack’ was not and unqualified success for the Luftwaffe and the British defences had for the most part worked as they were intended to do.
The RAF was not just Fighter Command, and today was the day that Bomber Command suffered a disaster in a raid on the airfield at Aalborg in Denmark. Bomber Command decided to send the 12 Blenheims of No. 82 Squadron out to attack the airfield which was occupied by the Germans. The 12 aircraft flew in almost cloudless skies across the North Sea, on reaching the Danish coast one turned back. Due to a navigational error the aircraft made land fall on the southern instead of northern Danish coast, meaning they had to fly almost the entire length of the country to reach their target. 20 miles short of Aalborg, flying at 8,000 feet in a clear sky, they were intercepted by nine Bf 109s which repeatedly attacked the Blenheims until the airfield flak took over. All 11 of the remaining Blenheims were eventually shot down, just 9 of the 33 airmen comprising their crews survived.
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Bet your keyboard is knackered!
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Dundas went on to become one of the most successful pilots of the Battle, and was lucky to survive this day.
Dundas joined 609 Squadron, Auxiliary Air Force in 1938. He was called to full-time service on 24th August 1939. In operations over Dunkirk Dundas destroyed an He 111 and shared a Do 17 on 31st May 1940 and damaged an He 111 on 1st June.
He claimed a Bf 110 destroyed on 13th July, another on the 19th, two more Bf 110's on 11th August and 12th August, a Ju 87 and another shared on the 13th, a Do 17 destroyed and an He 111 shared on the 14th, a probable Bf 110 on the 25th, a Do 17 shared and another damaged on 15th September, a Bf 110 destroyed and a Do 17 damaged on the 24th, a Do 17 destroyed on the 25th, a Bf 109 destroyed and a Do 17 damaged on the 26th, a Bf 110 destroyed on the 27th, a shared Bf 110 on 7th October and a Bf 110 on the 15th.
Dundas was awarded the DFC (gazetted 22nd October 1940).
On 27th November he probably destroyed a Ju 88 and on the 28th he destroyed a Bf 109 flown by Major Helmut Wick off the Isle of Wight. Wick was, with Galland, one of the Luftwaffe's leading 'experten'. Almost immediately Dundas was himself attacked by Wick's No. 2 and shot down after being chased out to sea. He was not seen again. He was 25 years old.
Dundas joined 609 Squadron, Auxiliary Air Force in 1938. He was called to full-time service on 24th August 1939. In operations over Dunkirk Dundas destroyed an He 111 and shared a Do 17 on 31st May 1940 and damaged an He 111 on 1st June.
He claimed a Bf 110 destroyed on 13th July, another on the 19th, two more Bf 110's on 11th August and 12th August, a Ju 87 and another shared on the 13th, a Do 17 destroyed and an He 111 shared on the 14th, a probable Bf 110 on the 25th, a Do 17 shared and another damaged on 15th September, a Bf 110 destroyed and a Do 17 damaged on the 24th, a Do 17 destroyed on the 25th, a Bf 109 destroyed and a Do 17 damaged on the 26th, a Bf 110 destroyed on the 27th, a shared Bf 110 on 7th October and a Bf 110 on the 15th.
Dundas was awarded the DFC (gazetted 22nd October 1940).
On 27th November he probably destroyed a Ju 88 and on the 28th he destroyed a Bf 109 flown by Major Helmut Wick off the Isle of Wight. Wick was, with Galland, one of the Luftwaffe's leading 'experten'. Almost immediately Dundas was himself attacked by Wick's No. 2 and shot down after being chased out to sea. He was not seen again. He was 25 years old.
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Wednesday 14 August
Still cloud over the Channel but with some sunny spells inland.
Today there was less action, but still significant Luftwaffe activity against Britain.
Shortly before midday 4 separate plots estimated as 20-30 aircraft each appeared over the Channel. Fighter Command scrambled Nos. 65,615,151, 610 and 32 Squadrons in response. At 12.05, 9 bomb carrying Bf 110s of Eprg 210 came in under low cloud and bombed Manston. For once the Luftwaffe had attacked an important Fighter Command station. 65 and 151 Squadrons were over Manston, but above the clouds and did not see the attack, though 151 did engage Bf 109s in the vicinity, presumably the escort to the bombers.
A Flight of 610 Squadron engaged 12 Bf 109s mid Channel, but these were a feint to draw British fighters away from the main raid, 50 Ju 87s escorted by 50 Bf 109s which headed for Folkestone/Dover. B Flight of 610 Squadron engaged the armada of Ju 87s over Folkestone. B Flight of 615 Squadron went to engage a group of Ju 87s attacking the Varne lightship (which was sunk). 32 Squadron arrived in time to engage Bf 109s that were covering the withdrawal of the Ju 87s.
2 of the Bf 110s that bombed Manston were shot down by ground fire and a third damaged, returning to France on one engine. 6 Bf 109s were shot down with 1 Ju 87. The RAF lost 3 Hurricanes shot down and another wrecked on landing, plus 3 Blenheims destroyed on the ground at Manston.
We have a first hand account of the only survivor of the Bf 110s shot down over Manston, Gefreiter Ewald Schank who had a miraculous escape from Bf 110 S9+MK.
“I dragged myself through the wreckage to search for the pilot [Unteroffizier Hans Steding, 23 +] but could see nothing. As I was all alone and helpless on the runway, three men in blue uniforms came. I did not know, or understand, any English words at the time. I said to the soldiers in German: “My friend is in the aircraft”. They took me in their midst and led me to a shelter, in which there were soldiers in brown uniforms and steel helmets with guns. A soldier spoke to me in German, but I no longer recall what he said. I asked him: “When will I be shot?” “You will not be shot” he replied “you will go to a prisoner camp with many others”. I probably said “Ich bin glucklich, dass mich Gott gerettet hat” (I’m lucky that God has saved me).
When the raid was over, I was taken in a car by two soldiers to hospital, and was immediately attended to by a doctor. I was in hospital for approximately 10 days. The following day [meaning 15 August] I was told that the remains of the pilot had been recovered from the wreckage.”
Between 16.00 and 18.30 the Luftwaffe tried another tactic in the West Country, sending a large number of smaller formations, usually 6 or 9 bombers, crossing the coast on a line between Start Point in Devon to Selsey Bill in West Sussex. In response 10 Group controllers despatched fighters mostly in Sections (three aircraft) to make interceptions. The bombers managed to bomb Colerne, St Athan, Kemble, Yeovilton, Andover and Hullavington, but the only Fighter Command field attacked was Middle Wallop. The airfield was badly hit, most of the damage being done by just five bombs that fell among the hangars. Hangar 5 was the most heavily damaged.
During these raids the Luftwaffe lost 5 He 111s and 2 Ju88s. The RAF had 2 fighters damaged.
At 17.00 a lone raider from KG 27 attacked the non-operational RAF field at Sealand (near Chester) before being shot down by 3 Spitfires flown by instructors from No. 7 OTU who had been scrambled to intercept. Here two young ladies (Wendy Anderton and Cathie Jones, both aged 11) point out some of the holes in the bullet riddled tail of the He 111.
The only other RAF casualty was Sgt H F Montgomery whose Hurricane L1739 (FT-Q) crashed into the sea following the interception of an He 111 30 miles off Beachy Head. His body was found on 11 September and buried by the Germans at Senneville-sur-Fecamp.
Today Fighter Command lost 6 fighters with another 11 damaged, plus 3 Blenheims on the ground.
The Luftwaffe lost 17 aircraft and suffered another 4 damaged on operations.
Again, the Luftwaffe has come off worst in the exchanges. Things are about to become even harder for them. Tomorrow will become known in the Luftwaffe as Black Thursday, and with good reason.
Still cloud over the Channel but with some sunny spells inland.
Today there was less action, but still significant Luftwaffe activity against Britain.
Shortly before midday 4 separate plots estimated as 20-30 aircraft each appeared over the Channel. Fighter Command scrambled Nos. 65,615,151, 610 and 32 Squadrons in response. At 12.05, 9 bomb carrying Bf 110s of Eprg 210 came in under low cloud and bombed Manston. For once the Luftwaffe had attacked an important Fighter Command station. 65 and 151 Squadrons were over Manston, but above the clouds and did not see the attack, though 151 did engage Bf 109s in the vicinity, presumably the escort to the bombers.
A Flight of 610 Squadron engaged 12 Bf 109s mid Channel, but these were a feint to draw British fighters away from the main raid, 50 Ju 87s escorted by 50 Bf 109s which headed for Folkestone/Dover. B Flight of 610 Squadron engaged the armada of Ju 87s over Folkestone. B Flight of 615 Squadron went to engage a group of Ju 87s attacking the Varne lightship (which was sunk). 32 Squadron arrived in time to engage Bf 109s that were covering the withdrawal of the Ju 87s.
2 of the Bf 110s that bombed Manston were shot down by ground fire and a third damaged, returning to France on one engine. 6 Bf 109s were shot down with 1 Ju 87. The RAF lost 3 Hurricanes shot down and another wrecked on landing, plus 3 Blenheims destroyed on the ground at Manston.
We have a first hand account of the only survivor of the Bf 110s shot down over Manston, Gefreiter Ewald Schank who had a miraculous escape from Bf 110 S9+MK.
“I dragged myself through the wreckage to search for the pilot [Unteroffizier Hans Steding, 23 +] but could see nothing. As I was all alone and helpless on the runway, three men in blue uniforms came. I did not know, or understand, any English words at the time. I said to the soldiers in German: “My friend is in the aircraft”. They took me in their midst and led me to a shelter, in which there were soldiers in brown uniforms and steel helmets with guns. A soldier spoke to me in German, but I no longer recall what he said. I asked him: “When will I be shot?” “You will not be shot” he replied “you will go to a prisoner camp with many others”. I probably said “Ich bin glucklich, dass mich Gott gerettet hat” (I’m lucky that God has saved me).
When the raid was over, I was taken in a car by two soldiers to hospital, and was immediately attended to by a doctor. I was in hospital for approximately 10 days. The following day [meaning 15 August] I was told that the remains of the pilot had been recovered from the wreckage.”
Between 16.00 and 18.30 the Luftwaffe tried another tactic in the West Country, sending a large number of smaller formations, usually 6 or 9 bombers, crossing the coast on a line between Start Point in Devon to Selsey Bill in West Sussex. In response 10 Group controllers despatched fighters mostly in Sections (three aircraft) to make interceptions. The bombers managed to bomb Colerne, St Athan, Kemble, Yeovilton, Andover and Hullavington, but the only Fighter Command field attacked was Middle Wallop. The airfield was badly hit, most of the damage being done by just five bombs that fell among the hangars. Hangar 5 was the most heavily damaged.
During these raids the Luftwaffe lost 5 He 111s and 2 Ju88s. The RAF had 2 fighters damaged.
At 17.00 a lone raider from KG 27 attacked the non-operational RAF field at Sealand (near Chester) before being shot down by 3 Spitfires flown by instructors from No. 7 OTU who had been scrambled to intercept. Here two young ladies (Wendy Anderton and Cathie Jones, both aged 11) point out some of the holes in the bullet riddled tail of the He 111.
The only other RAF casualty was Sgt H F Montgomery whose Hurricane L1739 (FT-Q) crashed into the sea following the interception of an He 111 30 miles off Beachy Head. His body was found on 11 September and buried by the Germans at Senneville-sur-Fecamp.
Today Fighter Command lost 6 fighters with another 11 damaged, plus 3 Blenheims on the ground.
The Luftwaffe lost 17 aircraft and suffered another 4 damaged on operations.
Again, the Luftwaffe has come off worst in the exchanges. Things are about to become even harder for them. Tomorrow will become known in the Luftwaffe as Black Thursday, and with good reason.
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Thursday August 15
Cloudy in the morning clearing to give fine and sunny weather in the south-east, but remaining overcast in the west and north.
This was the day on which the Luftwaffe launched an all out assault on Fighter Command. It would become known as the Luftwaffe’s ‘Black Thursday’. Events today were many and complicated and hundreds of pages have been devoted to the various actions. To start, I have attempted to establish a simplified timeline of the day’s major events.
1) 11.30-12.00 An estimated 60 Ju 87s with a large force of 50 escorting Bf 109s crossed the coast near Dungeness. They had been seen by RDF forming up over Cap Gris Nez and Nos, 54, 56, 501 and 614 Squadrons sent off to their patrol lines. Only 56 squadron failed to make contact. 26 Ju 87s of II./StG1 bombed Lympne and withdrew without being intercepted. About 30 Ju 87s of IV(St)/LG1 made for Dover and Hawkinge, both being bombed. No. 501 Squadron managed to bounce these Ju 87s. A small group of Bf 110s flashed over Manston strafing and bombing as they went. No 54 Squadron attacked a large group of Bf 109s off the coast of Dover, and then found Ju 87s bombing the port, protected by at least 40 Bf 109s orbiting above. As 615 Squadron arrived its B Flight was bounced by these Bf 109s.
Luftflotte 5 based in Norway and Denmark launch simultaneous attacks on the north east coast.
2) 12.30-13-15 A diversionary raid by He 115 floatplanes attempted to lure fighters north in the belief that Edinburgh was the target. Radar showed a large plot approaching the Northumberland coast and Nos. 72, 605, 41, 79 and 607 Squadrons were scrambled. 72 Squadron, searching for a 30+ raid was the first to see the German air armada, about 30 miles off the Farne Islands. They met a large force of He 111s with an escort of Bf 110s. This was 63 He 111s of I and III./KG 26 with an escort of 21 Bf 110s of I./ZG 76. Legend has it that F/Lt Graham hesitated on seeing this formation, leading one of his pilots to enquire whether he had seen the enemy formation. Graham who had a stammer, supposedly replied ‘Of course I’ve seen the b-b-b-bastards, I’m trying to w-w-w-work out what to do’. Graham and 72 squadron attacked and managed to separate some of the escorts from the bombers. Off Sunderland the formation split into two formations one heading NW the other SW. No 79 Squadron was next to engage, attacking come Bf 110s approaching Acklington and then a large formation He 111s, escorted by more Bf 110s, headed towards Newcastle. No. 605 Squadron also attacked this formation, its B Flight attempted to stand between the bombers and Newcastle. No. 41 Squadron attacked the southern formation, joined by No. 607 Squadron a few minutes later.
3) 12.10-14-00 A second raid was plotted 100 miles to the south, estimated 30+, heading for Scarborough. This raid consisted entirely of the 50 Ju 88s of I, II and III KG 30, flying from Aalborg in Denmark. This raid crossed the coast near Bridlington and also split into two formations, one headed south for Driffield, the other north towards Tyneside. Nos. 616, 264 (Defiants), A and B Flights of 73 and 219 Squadron (Blenheims) were all ordered off. No 616 Squadron sighted the raid ten miles of Flamborough Head and were joined by B Flight of 73 Squadron in an interception. A Flight failed to make contact, as did the Defiants of 264 Squadron. The Blenheims of 219 Squadron made contact, but were far too slow to make meaningful attacks, they engaged in fruitless tail chases with the retreating Ju 88s. Driffield was heavily bombed, 14 service personnel were killed, including Margueritte Hudson, a 19 year old WAAF, the first to be killed in the Battle of Britain.
A large raid developed over Kent, which may have been intended partly as cover for a precision attack by Eprg 210.
4) 14.50-15-15 Back in the South East, and five raids, an estimated 250 aircraft, Do 17s with escorts of Bf 109s appear on 11 Groups plotting table. Nos. 64, 151, 111 and 501 Squadrons were scrambled to their patrol lines. No. 64 Squadron engaged Bf 109s at 22,000 feet, but were in turn attacked by another formation of 30 Bf 109s. No. 151 Squadrons Hurricanes were ordered to attack bombers over Deal, but were driven off by the escorting Bf 109s. No 111 Squadron had more success, attacking the Do 17s of I and II./KG 3 chasing them out over the Thames estuary. III./KG 3 meanwhile went to Eastchurch, again. Just 7 Hurricanes of No 501 Squadron reached their patrol area in time, to find an estimated 150 Do 17s high above them crossing the coast near Folkestone. They climbed to engage and chased the bombers across Kent to the Thames estuary. Other smaller raids by KG I and II attacked targets in Kent and were not intercepted. Their notable successes were the bombing of the Short’s and Pobjoy works in Rochester, disrupting production at both for several days.
5) 14.55-15-30 A large raid passed North Foreland undetected because the RDF station was still off air. This was an attack by Epgr 210 on Martlesham Heath in Suffolk. The raid was not plotted until it was just off Orfordness and though elements of no less than eight squadrons, some of which were already airborne, were tasked to the raid only 1 and part of 17 squadron intercepted. 32 squadron sighted some raiders but failed to intercept. None of the others made contact. This is surely a sign of what might have been. Martlesham Heath was not badly damaged, though two hangars were hit.
6) 17.30-17.45 10 Group began to see a large raid developing. By 17.20 seven raids were detected approaching the coast between Portland and Selsey Bill. Nos 10 and 11 Groups would despatch the largest fighter force yet assembled. In defence of Portland Nos. 152, 87 and 213 Squadrons are sent off. 152 was first to see the enemy, 47 Ju 87s of I./StG 1 (target Warmwell) and II./StG 2 (Yeovil) escorted by 40 Bf 110s and 60 Bf 109s. The other two squadrons also arrived to intercept.
7) 17.30-19.00 First Phase. Between Thorney Island and Winchester. Two relatively small raids of 30 Ju 88s with 20 Bf 110 escorts crossed the coast at Selsey Bill, heading for the airfields at Andover and Worthy Down. Between 17.05 and 17.50 Fighter Command despatched twelve squadrons. Nos. 43, 111, 32 and 601 engaged this raid.
Phase Two. Middle Wallop to Southampton. No 609 Squadron took off as Middle Wallop was bombed, the raid was engaged by 249 squadron as it withdrew. No 234 Squadron, patrolling near Swanage caught sight of the raid as it withdrew and also made an attack.
For a second time today a large raid over Kent served as a diversion for a smaller precision raid.
8) As the earlier raids withdrew a series of new RDF plots appeared, 60+ aircraft approaching the coast between Dover and Dungeness. This raid again divided, Ju 88s and Do 17s heading for Biggin Hill, but bombing West Malling and a smaller raid of the Bf 110s of Eprg 210 heading for Kenley, that bombed Croydon. One airfield looks much like another. Fighter Command sent off Nos. 266, 54, 610, 615, 501, 151, 64 and 43 Squadrons. The ‘West Malling’ raid was met first by 266 squadron off Dover and several others engaged. West Malling was bombed and rendered inoperable for four days. The ‘Kenley’ raid was intercepted by Nos 32 and 111 Squadrons and Eprg 210 was badly mauled losing seven of its Bf 110s, including that of Hptm Walter Rubensdorffer, the Gruppenkommandeur, who was killed.
What were the results of the day’s action?
First, the British view. The Ju 87s bombing Kent in the first raid had caught no aircraft on the ground, but hangars and other facilities at both Hawkinge and Lympne were destroyed and damaged. Dover, Rye and Foreness radar stations were put off air for the rest of the day, but the Luftwaffe ignored such success and anyway never sought to exploit it.
32 civilians were killed and 105 injured in the ‘Battle of Sunderland’ as He 111s scattered their bombs over a large area.
The Ju 88s that bombed Yorkshire killed three men and caused substantial damage and casualties at Driffield, also destroying nine Whitley bombers and a Miles Magister trainer.
The bombing of Rochester caused damage to the airfield and disrupted production at the Short Bros. and Pobjoy works.
Eastchurch was bombed again, but little damage done.
Eprg 210’s raid on Martlesham Heath caused widespread damage and destroyed one Fairey Battle.
The Ju 88s that managed to bomb Andover (an Army Cooperation Command airfield) and Worthy Down (Fleet Air Arm) did little damage, but Middle Wallop was hit again.
The attack on West Malling (intended for Biggin Hill) killed two airmen. The field was not operational anyway. Eprg 210’s attack on Croydon (intended for Kenley) did considerable damage and killed 6 airmen and 62 civilians, but at great cost to the attacking unit.
As for the fighting in the air, the RAF had lost 25 fighters (11 Spitfires, 14 Hurricanes) with another 19 damaged. 12 pilots had been killed and another 3 lost as PoWs.
So what of the Luftwaffe?
Aircraft that failed to return amounted to 25 Bf 110s, 16 Ju 88s, 9 He 111s, 6 Ju 87s, 6 Bf 109s, 3 Do 17s, 1 He 115, 1 He 59 and 1 Ar 196, total losses of 68 aircraft. Another 20 aircraft returned damaged, some written off. 184 airmen were killed or taken prisoner.
The Luftwaffe pilots claimed to have shot down 102 British fighters. This was reduced by Luftwaffe Intelligence by about 30%, to 70. It was another manifest failure of the Luftwaffe Intelligence service. Kesselring chose to believe the figures, reckoning the Fighter Command must already be on its last legs. Hugo Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, did not and concluded that Fighter Command might still have 1,000 aircraft at its disposal. Neither was correct, but Sperrle was closest.
Cloudy in the morning clearing to give fine and sunny weather in the south-east, but remaining overcast in the west and north.
This was the day on which the Luftwaffe launched an all out assault on Fighter Command. It would become known as the Luftwaffe’s ‘Black Thursday’. Events today were many and complicated and hundreds of pages have been devoted to the various actions. To start, I have attempted to establish a simplified timeline of the day’s major events.
1) 11.30-12.00 An estimated 60 Ju 87s with a large force of 50 escorting Bf 109s crossed the coast near Dungeness. They had been seen by RDF forming up over Cap Gris Nez and Nos, 54, 56, 501 and 614 Squadrons sent off to their patrol lines. Only 56 squadron failed to make contact. 26 Ju 87s of II./StG1 bombed Lympne and withdrew without being intercepted. About 30 Ju 87s of IV(St)/LG1 made for Dover and Hawkinge, both being bombed. No. 501 Squadron managed to bounce these Ju 87s. A small group of Bf 110s flashed over Manston strafing and bombing as they went. No 54 Squadron attacked a large group of Bf 109s off the coast of Dover, and then found Ju 87s bombing the port, protected by at least 40 Bf 109s orbiting above. As 615 Squadron arrived its B Flight was bounced by these Bf 109s.
Luftflotte 5 based in Norway and Denmark launch simultaneous attacks on the north east coast.
2) 12.30-13-15 A diversionary raid by He 115 floatplanes attempted to lure fighters north in the belief that Edinburgh was the target. Radar showed a large plot approaching the Northumberland coast and Nos. 72, 605, 41, 79 and 607 Squadrons were scrambled. 72 Squadron, searching for a 30+ raid was the first to see the German air armada, about 30 miles off the Farne Islands. They met a large force of He 111s with an escort of Bf 110s. This was 63 He 111s of I and III./KG 26 with an escort of 21 Bf 110s of I./ZG 76. Legend has it that F/Lt Graham hesitated on seeing this formation, leading one of his pilots to enquire whether he had seen the enemy formation. Graham who had a stammer, supposedly replied ‘Of course I’ve seen the b-b-b-bastards, I’m trying to w-w-w-work out what to do’. Graham and 72 squadron attacked and managed to separate some of the escorts from the bombers. Off Sunderland the formation split into two formations one heading NW the other SW. No 79 Squadron was next to engage, attacking come Bf 110s approaching Acklington and then a large formation He 111s, escorted by more Bf 110s, headed towards Newcastle. No. 605 Squadron also attacked this formation, its B Flight attempted to stand between the bombers and Newcastle. No. 41 Squadron attacked the southern formation, joined by No. 607 Squadron a few minutes later.
3) 12.10-14-00 A second raid was plotted 100 miles to the south, estimated 30+, heading for Scarborough. This raid consisted entirely of the 50 Ju 88s of I, II and III KG 30, flying from Aalborg in Denmark. This raid crossed the coast near Bridlington and also split into two formations, one headed south for Driffield, the other north towards Tyneside. Nos. 616, 264 (Defiants), A and B Flights of 73 and 219 Squadron (Blenheims) were all ordered off. No 616 Squadron sighted the raid ten miles of Flamborough Head and were joined by B Flight of 73 Squadron in an interception. A Flight failed to make contact, as did the Defiants of 264 Squadron. The Blenheims of 219 Squadron made contact, but were far too slow to make meaningful attacks, they engaged in fruitless tail chases with the retreating Ju 88s. Driffield was heavily bombed, 14 service personnel were killed, including Margueritte Hudson, a 19 year old WAAF, the first to be killed in the Battle of Britain.
A large raid developed over Kent, which may have been intended partly as cover for a precision attack by Eprg 210.
4) 14.50-15-15 Back in the South East, and five raids, an estimated 250 aircraft, Do 17s with escorts of Bf 109s appear on 11 Groups plotting table. Nos. 64, 151, 111 and 501 Squadrons were scrambled to their patrol lines. No. 64 Squadron engaged Bf 109s at 22,000 feet, but were in turn attacked by another formation of 30 Bf 109s. No. 151 Squadrons Hurricanes were ordered to attack bombers over Deal, but were driven off by the escorting Bf 109s. No 111 Squadron had more success, attacking the Do 17s of I and II./KG 3 chasing them out over the Thames estuary. III./KG 3 meanwhile went to Eastchurch, again. Just 7 Hurricanes of No 501 Squadron reached their patrol area in time, to find an estimated 150 Do 17s high above them crossing the coast near Folkestone. They climbed to engage and chased the bombers across Kent to the Thames estuary. Other smaller raids by KG I and II attacked targets in Kent and were not intercepted. Their notable successes were the bombing of the Short’s and Pobjoy works in Rochester, disrupting production at both for several days.
5) 14.55-15-30 A large raid passed North Foreland undetected because the RDF station was still off air. This was an attack by Epgr 210 on Martlesham Heath in Suffolk. The raid was not plotted until it was just off Orfordness and though elements of no less than eight squadrons, some of which were already airborne, were tasked to the raid only 1 and part of 17 squadron intercepted. 32 squadron sighted some raiders but failed to intercept. None of the others made contact. This is surely a sign of what might have been. Martlesham Heath was not badly damaged, though two hangars were hit.
6) 17.30-17.45 10 Group began to see a large raid developing. By 17.20 seven raids were detected approaching the coast between Portland and Selsey Bill. Nos 10 and 11 Groups would despatch the largest fighter force yet assembled. In defence of Portland Nos. 152, 87 and 213 Squadrons are sent off. 152 was first to see the enemy, 47 Ju 87s of I./StG 1 (target Warmwell) and II./StG 2 (Yeovil) escorted by 40 Bf 110s and 60 Bf 109s. The other two squadrons also arrived to intercept.
7) 17.30-19.00 First Phase. Between Thorney Island and Winchester. Two relatively small raids of 30 Ju 88s with 20 Bf 110 escorts crossed the coast at Selsey Bill, heading for the airfields at Andover and Worthy Down. Between 17.05 and 17.50 Fighter Command despatched twelve squadrons. Nos. 43, 111, 32 and 601 engaged this raid.
Phase Two. Middle Wallop to Southampton. No 609 Squadron took off as Middle Wallop was bombed, the raid was engaged by 249 squadron as it withdrew. No 234 Squadron, patrolling near Swanage caught sight of the raid as it withdrew and also made an attack.
For a second time today a large raid over Kent served as a diversion for a smaller precision raid.
8) As the earlier raids withdrew a series of new RDF plots appeared, 60+ aircraft approaching the coast between Dover and Dungeness. This raid again divided, Ju 88s and Do 17s heading for Biggin Hill, but bombing West Malling and a smaller raid of the Bf 110s of Eprg 210 heading for Kenley, that bombed Croydon. One airfield looks much like another. Fighter Command sent off Nos. 266, 54, 610, 615, 501, 151, 64 and 43 Squadrons. The ‘West Malling’ raid was met first by 266 squadron off Dover and several others engaged. West Malling was bombed and rendered inoperable for four days. The ‘Kenley’ raid was intercepted by Nos 32 and 111 Squadrons and Eprg 210 was badly mauled losing seven of its Bf 110s, including that of Hptm Walter Rubensdorffer, the Gruppenkommandeur, who was killed.
What were the results of the day’s action?
First, the British view. The Ju 87s bombing Kent in the first raid had caught no aircraft on the ground, but hangars and other facilities at both Hawkinge and Lympne were destroyed and damaged. Dover, Rye and Foreness radar stations were put off air for the rest of the day, but the Luftwaffe ignored such success and anyway never sought to exploit it.
32 civilians were killed and 105 injured in the ‘Battle of Sunderland’ as He 111s scattered their bombs over a large area.
The Ju 88s that bombed Yorkshire killed three men and caused substantial damage and casualties at Driffield, also destroying nine Whitley bombers and a Miles Magister trainer.
The bombing of Rochester caused damage to the airfield and disrupted production at the Short Bros. and Pobjoy works.
Eastchurch was bombed again, but little damage done.
Eprg 210’s raid on Martlesham Heath caused widespread damage and destroyed one Fairey Battle.
The Ju 88s that managed to bomb Andover (an Army Cooperation Command airfield) and Worthy Down (Fleet Air Arm) did little damage, but Middle Wallop was hit again.
The attack on West Malling (intended for Biggin Hill) killed two airmen. The field was not operational anyway. Eprg 210’s attack on Croydon (intended for Kenley) did considerable damage and killed 6 airmen and 62 civilians, but at great cost to the attacking unit.
As for the fighting in the air, the RAF had lost 25 fighters (11 Spitfires, 14 Hurricanes) with another 19 damaged. 12 pilots had been killed and another 3 lost as PoWs.
So what of the Luftwaffe?
Aircraft that failed to return amounted to 25 Bf 110s, 16 Ju 88s, 9 He 111s, 6 Ju 87s, 6 Bf 109s, 3 Do 17s, 1 He 115, 1 He 59 and 1 Ar 196, total losses of 68 aircraft. Another 20 aircraft returned damaged, some written off. 184 airmen were killed or taken prisoner.
The Luftwaffe pilots claimed to have shot down 102 British fighters. This was reduced by Luftwaffe Intelligence by about 30%, to 70. It was another manifest failure of the Luftwaffe Intelligence service. Kesselring chose to believe the figures, reckoning the Fighter Command must already be on its last legs. Hugo Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, did not and concluded that Fighter Command might still have 1,000 aircraft at its disposal. Neither was correct, but Sperrle was closest.
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Wow Steve,
Absolutely intense reading and it must have been a bear to try and and sort out all the info to type up here. Kudos to you for a fantastic job Sir!!! Thank you so much for your effort......
Prost
Allen
Absolutely intense reading and it must have been a bear to try and and sort out all the info to type up here. Kudos to you for a fantastic job Sir!!! Thank you so much for your effort......
Prost
Allen
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Allen, the biggest problem is deciding what to put in and what to leave out! There is so much information available today that people have literally written books about the action on days like this one. Time and space are obvious constraints here, but I try to give an idea of the intensity and pace of events today, eighty years ago.
Formations of hundreds of aircraft are almost unimaginable to us today. The formation that the stammering F/Lt Graham of 72 Squadron confronted was advancing on a ten mile wide front! Graham and his men had found themselves on the northern flank of the German formation and might not have appreciated how wide it was. Almost unbelievably, several of the 72 squadron pilots who attacked subsequently lost contact with the Germans! Here is just one Combat Report, from F/O D F B Sheen, who was flying as Green 1 with B Flight of 72 Squadron.
"I was detailed as Green 1 with two sections of 2 aircraft each, patrolling both flanks as required.
When Blue and Red sections attacked Green Section remained behind until the enemy formation had split up. I ordered individual attacks. Formations of Ju 88 and Me 110 were forming defensive circles while the other aircraft jettisoned their bombs and escaped in cloud.
I attacked a straggler in a circle of Ju 88s. This aircraft carried one (1) very large bomb underneath the fuselage. Fire was opened at about 200 yards range dead astern and slightly below. The second burst of about 3 seconds hit the bomb. The E/A disappeared in minute fragments.
6 E/A believed Me 110s were then observed in a similar formation and an attempt was made to pick one out. Another showed signs of attacking me and a deflection shot approaching head-on was tried. This was not successful but another shot was made. Immediately flame and smoke appeared near the inside of the port engine. The E/A either with the pilot shot, or in a deliberate attempt to ram me, approached head-on, left wing low. Violent evasive action was taken and the E/A disappeared over my head with the flame and smoke greatly increasing in volume.
No evasive action was taken by the Ju 88 and no return fire of any description was encountered from either E/A. The remaining E/A were lost in cloud and attempts to locate the main body failed. I therefore returned to base and refuelled.
A further short patrol of 20 minutes was made but no contact was made."
At the risk of stating the obvious, confronting these formations as they approached their target, breaking them up, forcing them into defensive circles and to jettison their bombs was a win for the RAF, whether they shot down the bombers or not. It was the essence of Dowding's system. The bombers were the targets and should, whenever possible, be attacked BEFORE they reached their targets. It was the reason for Fighter Command's forward defensive posture, why it detached squadrons to satellite fields like Hawkinge and the reason why Dowding, though he allowed the airfields to be mined for destruction in case of an invasion, would not countenance a withdrawal of his forces before an invasion arrived.
Formations of hundreds of aircraft are almost unimaginable to us today. The formation that the stammering F/Lt Graham of 72 Squadron confronted was advancing on a ten mile wide front! Graham and his men had found themselves on the northern flank of the German formation and might not have appreciated how wide it was. Almost unbelievably, several of the 72 squadron pilots who attacked subsequently lost contact with the Germans! Here is just one Combat Report, from F/O D F B Sheen, who was flying as Green 1 with B Flight of 72 Squadron.
"I was detailed as Green 1 with two sections of 2 aircraft each, patrolling both flanks as required.
When Blue and Red sections attacked Green Section remained behind until the enemy formation had split up. I ordered individual attacks. Formations of Ju 88 and Me 110 were forming defensive circles while the other aircraft jettisoned their bombs and escaped in cloud.
I attacked a straggler in a circle of Ju 88s. This aircraft carried one (1) very large bomb underneath the fuselage. Fire was opened at about 200 yards range dead astern and slightly below. The second burst of about 3 seconds hit the bomb. The E/A disappeared in minute fragments.
6 E/A believed Me 110s were then observed in a similar formation and an attempt was made to pick one out. Another showed signs of attacking me and a deflection shot approaching head-on was tried. This was not successful but another shot was made. Immediately flame and smoke appeared near the inside of the port engine. The E/A either with the pilot shot, or in a deliberate attempt to ram me, approached head-on, left wing low. Violent evasive action was taken and the E/A disappeared over my head with the flame and smoke greatly increasing in volume.
No evasive action was taken by the Ju 88 and no return fire of any description was encountered from either E/A. The remaining E/A were lost in cloud and attempts to locate the main body failed. I therefore returned to base and refuelled.
A further short patrol of 20 minutes was made but no contact was made."
At the risk of stating the obvious, confronting these formations as they approached their target, breaking them up, forcing them into defensive circles and to jettison their bombs was a win for the RAF, whether they shot down the bombers or not. It was the essence of Dowding's system. The bombers were the targets and should, whenever possible, be attacked BEFORE they reached their targets. It was the reason for Fighter Command's forward defensive posture, why it detached squadrons to satellite fields like Hawkinge and the reason why Dowding, though he allowed the airfields to be mined for destruction in case of an invasion, would not countenance a withdrawal of his forces before an invasion arrived.
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