Battle of Britain diary

[Neil Merryweather]

this is awesome stuff, Steve, many thanks for the hard work you are putting in

 

[Tim Marlow]

Fascinating stuff, an excellent précis from the mass of information available as well.

 

[AlanG]

August 15 1940

After the days events, in which Winston Churchill had been tensely watching the furious fighting from Fighter Command Ops. He commented that he had seen proof of Hugh Dowding's genius: "The foresight of Air Marshall Dowding deserves high praise, but even more remarkable have been the restraints and the exact measurement of formidable stresses which had reserved a fighter force in the north through all these long weeks of mortal conflict in the south. We must regard the generalship here shown as an example of genius in the art of war."

Driving back to Chequers with General Ismay, Churchill was heard to say those infamous words. "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many, to so few."

 

[Neil Merryweather]

For all Churchill's praise , the 'powers that be' in the RAF at the time treated both Dowding and Park very shoddily afterwards.

 

[stona]

For all Churchill's praise , the 'powers that be' in the RAF at the time treated both Dowding and Park very shoddily afterwards.

Here's my take on this episode, writing about which usually generates more heat than light!

The removal of Dowding, and to a lesser extent Park, had much to do with Air Ministry politics.

Wind the clock back to May 1940, when Sinclair assumed his office as Air Minister.

Dowding was due to retire on July 14th and Sinclair wanted to hold him to this date. This Sinclair mentioned to Churchill who wrote an angry letter to Sinclair declaring his support for Dowding and then concluded by saying that not only should Dowding’s appointment be extended ‘while the war lasted’ but, crucially, that this would not exclude him being ‘moved to a higher position, if that were thought necessary’.

Much is made of the Big Wing controversy, and Dowding’s inability to counter the Luftwaffe’s night bombing (nobody could have in October 1940), and it is true that these were later sticks used to beat Dowding, but they were not at the bottom of the cesspool of Air Ministry politics.
The seemingly innocuous suggestion by Churchill set alarm bells ringing in the Air Ministry. Sinclair discussed it with his colleagues of the Air Council and it certainly reached the ears of Trenchard and Salmond.

The implication was that Dowding might become, in the future, Chief of the Air Staff, a nightmare scenario in the opposition camp. The entire independent existence of the Royal Air Force, of which Trenchard was the architect, was based on the doctrine that the air would become a decisive strategic arm in its own right and determine the outcome of future wars. Salmond was both Trenchard’s disciple and successor. The strategic role of the bomber was the raison d’etre of the Air Force, it was the ruling doctrine to which everything else was secondary. If Fighter Command was successful in defeating the Luftwaffe that might be negated. It would mean that defence checkmated offence and their lives’ work would amount to nought. The reaction at the highest level of the RAF was that Dowding must be stopped.

The men who would eventually put the removal of Dowding to Churchill were Sinclair and Portal, but they had broad support across the Air Ministry, on the Air Council and at all levels of the RAF. Initially Churchill wavered, it took nearly two days for Churchill to finally agree that Dowding should go. He, like Beaverbrook and other senior politicians, abandoned him. Churchill did not fire Dowding, though it would have been almost impossible to remove him without the PMs approval.

It has been argued by some (including Deighton) that Churchill abandoned Dowding (‘threw him to the wolves’) because of an earlier disagreement about sending fighters to France, but I see little merit in this argument. I can’t possibly present them all in a reply like this, but I believe it was Portal’s argument that swayed Churchill. Portal acknowledged that Dowding was superb in defence, but questioned his offensive capabilities. This surely touched a nerve in Churchill, who was never happy in defence, but revelled in aggression. The resources put into Bomber Command would amply demonstrate the results of this.

To be fair to Churchill, when the Air Ministry tried to write Dowding (and Park) out of the official history of the Battle of Britain, he sprang to Dowding’s defence, writing in forthright terms to Sinclair that

‘The jealousies and cliquism that have led to this offence are a discredit to the Air Ministry, and I do not think any other Service Department would have been guilty of such a piece of work.
What would have been said if the War Office had produced the story of the Battle of Libya and had managed to exclude General Wavell's name, or if the Admiralty had told the tale of Trafalgar and left Lord Nelson out of it!...It grieves me very much that you should associate yourself with such behaviour. I am sure you were not consulted beforehand on the point, and your natural loyalty to everything done in your department can alone have led you to condone what nine out of ten men would unhesitatingly condemn.'

Dowding’s reaction to his removal is revealing.

“Churchill told me that I was to be replaced as C-in-C Fighter Command. He told me of his surprise at this recommendation should have been made ‘in the moment of victory’, but did not indicate any personal opposition. It seemed natural enough to me: The Air Council had been anxious to be rid of me since before the start of the war, and this seemed to be an appropriate moment.”

Dowding was not blameless. He had opportunities to remove Leigh-Mallory on at least two occasions before the war and he never intervened effectively in The 'Big Wing' debate allowing Leigh-Mallory and his clique of disloyal RAF officers (Bader, MacDonald, Kingston-McCloughry) and ill informed or hostile officers at the Air ministry (Sholto-Douglas, Sinclair, Salmond et alter), politicians (Balfour, Ward) and even Trenchard himself, to engineer his own removal in November.

BTW, after his removal Dowding was told by Sinclair that he was to lead a technical mission to the US, it was Beaverbrook’s idea. Dowding told Churchill that he did not wish to do so, but was convinced to go. His objective was to convince the Americans to build the Napier ‘Sabre’ engine. He initially convinced Roosevelt that the Americans should do so, but the decision was reversed. Dowding also managed to create a diplomatic furore (‘unexpected commotion’ in Dowding’s words) with remarks he made about the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund which had launched a fund raising campaign in the US from the Washington Embassy. Dowding thought it a matter for the British public, referred to it as ‘barefaced panhandling’ and upset a lot of people on both sides of the Atlantic, including Churchill! Even his most ardent apologists, of which I am one, would not claim that he was an easy man.

 

[stona]

Friday 16 August

Warm and humid, but with cloud covering southern England.

The cloud limited Luftwaffe action in the morning, but late in the morning RDF plots of four formations, 100+ aircraft, were seen heading towards the south coast between Dungeness and Margate. Fighter Command reacted by keeping a small number of aircraft over their ‘home’ airfields while scrambling No 111 Squadron to patrol Hawkinge, 266 to patrol Manston and 56 to patrol Rochford. First into action was No. 111 Squadron, who attacked a formation of 20+ Do 17s and their escort of Bf 109s head on. They failed to turn back the raid which continued on to bomb West Malling. No. 266 Squadron became entangled with a group of Bf 109s at 22,000 feet and was unable to prevent the Do 17s, far below, from bombing Tilbury docks. As this was going on, three more squadrons were scrambled, No 45 from Hornchurch to patrol their base, 64 from Kenley to patrol Dover and 32 from Biggin Hill, also to patrol Dover. At this time enemy formations were heading up the Thames estuary. KG 3, presumably targeting Tilbury docks bombed short, hitting the town of Northfleet, killing 29 civilians. No 54 Squadron arrived but failed to intercept when they saw the escorting Bf 109s above.

During the fighting the Luftwaffe lost 5 Bf 109s and just 1 Do 17, a reflection of the fighting between the escorts and British fighters which allowed the bombers to escape almost unscathed. Fighter Command lost 7 of its fighters.

At 12.30 RDF detected a raid forming up over Cherbourg and heading towards the Solent/Portsmouth area. In response five squadrons were scrambled, Nos. 1, 43, 601, 249, 213 and 152. It was No 43 that was the first to engage making a head on attack. The Ju 87s of I./StG 2 remained intact and pushed on to Tangmere. The Hurricanes of 601 squadron had been instructed to engage the fighter cover at 20,000 feet, but seeing no Bf 109s instead dived on the Ju 87s as they started to bomb. No 43 Squadron also arrived on the scene. S/Ldr Johnstone, the C/O of 602 Squadron saw the bombing of Tangmere and scrambled from Westhampnett, he knew he could not intercept the raid, but did not want to be caught on the ground. Tangmere was badly hit, 13 RAF personnel killed and 7 Hurricanes, 6 Blenheims and 2 Spitfires destroyed.

It was during this phase of the fighting that American Billy Fiske was fatally injured, his funeral would be the subject of a trans-Atlantic propaganda broadcast. It was also as a result of his actions today that F/Lt Nicholson would be awarded a Victoria Cross.

The Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s and 9 Ju 87s (another 7 returned damaged). The RAF had lost 5 of its fighters with another 6 damaged, in addition to those destroyed on the ground at Tangmere.

Shortly after tea time at about 16.30 RDF plots showed another attack developing. Four plots, totalling 100+ were forming up over Dunkirk-Boulogne, threatening Dover, and another 100+ were heading from Cherbourg towards the Isle of Wight.

The first three raids crossed the coast on a wide front from South Foreland to Dungeness and another crossed the Essex coast. Fighter Command sent of seven squadrons, Nos. 65, 610, 32, 56, 64, 501 and 19. There was heavy cloud and both bombing and combat was confused an widespread. The various reports show that 65 squadron was the first in action, engaging 60 Do 17s of I./KG 2 and ‘200 fighters’ in the South Foreland area. 501 squadron engaged the same formation near Maidstone. 56 Squadron engaged some Do 17s and their escort over the Thames estuary. 32 squadron made a head on attack on the 50 Ju 88s of KG 51 and their escorting Bf 110s near Sevenoaks. Another formation of Ju 88s (LG1?) scattered bombs over Eastbourne. 610 and 64 squadrons attacked Ju 88s and Bf 110s north of Dungeness. 40+ He 111s of KG 53 and KG 1, escorted by Bf 110s, crossed the coast at Harwich and wandered about looking for targets before they were intercepted by some of 610 squadrons Spitfires (A Flight which was trialling cannon armament).

The Luftwaffe lost 4 Bf 109s, 3 Do 17s and 1 Bf 110, with several other aircraft damaged. The RAF lost 3 fighters, all Spitfires with another destroyed by strafing at Manston.

The second element of this raid reached the coast on a front between the Isle of Wight and Worthing. This time six squadrons were scrambled, Nos 615, 1, 602, 601, 152 and 234. The 200 or so enemy aircraft roamed all over the south of England, afforded protection by the cloud. Bombs were scattered across the countryside with no apparent target. Occasionally RAF fighters would catch one of the small formations.

The Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s, 3 He 111s and 5 Bf 110s. The RAF lost 2 of its fighters.

The final tally for the day for the Luftwaffe was a loss of 39 aircraft, destroyed or written off, with another 22 damaged. The RAF lost 22 aircraft, destroyed or written off, with another 16 damaged. A further 9 fighters were destroyed on the ground.

Even at this early stage the damage that the Luftwaffe needed to inflict on Fighter Command was not being achieved, though poor intelligence led some commanders to believe that it was. In fact far from achieving a 5:1 positive exchange ratio the Luftwaffe was regularly losing more of its own aircraft and suffering a negative gross exchange rate. Even the fighter:fighter rate was closer to 1:1 than it was to 5:1

There were many human casualties on the ground today, but unlucky was this hare, struck by a Heinkel 111 of 7./KG 55 as it made a forced landing near Worthing, having been shot down by fighters, probably of No 602 Squadron.



I suspect he is going to end up as someone’s dinner. Maybe the Corporal on the right (holding a magazine for one of the bomber’s machine guns) will pull rank on the soldier to the left (also grasping a magazine) who looks like he might eat the hare raw

 

[scottie3158]

Steve,
Just had a good catch up. Thoroughly entertaining stuff and many thanks for taking the time to put it to the forum.

 

[Neil Merryweather]

Here's my take on this episode, writing about which usually generates more heat than light!

Brilliantly succinct-- top marks Steve!

 

[colin m]

16 August 1940

Not a major event in the Battle of Britain, but on this day, BF-110 2N + AP from 9./ZG 76, of which I'm building the Eduard version, crash landed after being shot down by a Spitfire from 602 Squadron.

 

[stona]

Hi Colin, it was a major event for Urban Schlaffer and Franz Obser, who would not have been expecting their war to end in a Sussex field

Information about your subject is quite sparse, but it was probably shot down by F/O Webb of 602 Squadron.

 

[stona]

Saturday 17 August

Today is a pleasant day with sunny periods and good visibility.

Despite the weather the Luftwaffe has a day off. Fighter Command moved its squadrons to its forward bases expecting the Luftwaffe to mount more attacks, but none came. The Luftwaffe did mount its reconnaissance and meteorological flights, and some shipping was attacked in St George’s Channel, but few aircraft flew over land. Fighter Command still flew 100 patrols with some 303 sorties.

Fighter Command also used the respite to undertake repairs to the airfields that had been hit over the previous days.

In the last eight days Fighter Command had lost 78 pilots killed, with a further 27 badly wounded. Since 1 August just 70 pilots had joined Fighter Command, mostly young and inexperienced, direct from the shortened courses being run by the OTUs. They were in no sense ready to be thrown directly into the fray. This was the beginning of a problem that would come to a head early the following month. Dowding had been pressing the Air Staff to release pilots from other commands to Fighter Command. Today an order was issued to allow 20 Battle and 12 Lysander pilots to volunteer for transfer to Fighter Command after a brief conversion course.

Given the lack of action, I thought a diversion might be in order, to which end I will attempt to answer this question.

What happened to downed aircraft on British soil?

Ultimately, they became the responsibility of the RAF. The responsibility for wrecks in the main Battle of Britain area, both British and German, fell to No. 49 MU based at RAF Faygate, near Horsham in Surrey. They would send a ‘Crash Party’ of eight to ten man to any reported wreck. Each party was under the command of a senior NCO but attached was a crash inspector (usually a Pilot Officer) who would assess the wreck and decide on equipment and manpower required to deal with it.

As far as enemy aircraft were concerned, there were two intelligence departments of relevance to downed Luftwaffe aircraft and airmen, AI1(g) and AI1(k). The first was responsible for gathering information about the aircraft, engines, weapons etc. and though its HQ was in London it had several field officers, not to be confused with the MU’s crash inspectors, who could examine crashed enemy aircraft and prepare a report. These officers were attached to the MUs responsible for recovery which gave easy access to wrecks all over the country. Their Crashed Enemy Aircraft Reports give invaluable information about the aircraft shot down over the UK, though some amount to nothing more than the report of a smoking hole in the ground.

The second department (AI1(k)) was responsible for gathering and interpreting information about the Luftwaffe’s organisational structure and personnel. It was officers from this branch that interrogated Luftwaffe airmen (these interrogations could be what we might today call ‘hard’), initially in the Tower of London, but later in 1940, as numbers of prisoners increased, at Trent Park, Cockfosters. This branch also had field officers who could make an initial interrogation soon after an enemy airman arrived and would also gather intelligence from documents found on the airmen or in the aircraft, like Ausweis (identity cards), pay books, Feldpostnummern (from letters), etc. These K reports were initially closed for 75 years due to the personal nature of the information contained; writing that someone was an ardent Nazi in 1940 might have an unjustified impact on someone’s later post war life for example. Some of these reports were passed to the Americans and declassified in the 1970s.

The aircraft themselves were made safe by the Crash Parties. Armament and ordnance were removed, this might involve the Army, and the wreck recovered to a dump, No 49 MU’s was beside the London-Horsham railway line. Rarely, German aircraft might be recovered to the RAE at Farnborough for further examination, most were ‘recycled’. The aircraft were broken up and the various material separated at the MU dumps, aluminium alloys, magnesium alloys, steel, copper, brass, plastics, rubber, ‘glass; etc. all had to be separated. The Northern Aluminium Company works near Banbury* were the main destination for the aluminium, which was cast into ingots for the British aircraft industry. At the end of the war Victory Bells, ‘cast from metal recovered from German aircraft shot down over Britain’ were sold to raise money for the RAF Benevolent Fund.

With British aircraft it would depend on the condition. Many were carefully recovered and made their way into the civilian repair organisation, where they would be repaired and returned to service. If written off they would be broken for salvage, like their German counterparts. Many crash sites were scenes of almost total destruction. In such cases, though a CEAR would be made, the Crash Party would ensure that the area was cleaned up and made as safe as possible before the crater would be filled in.

Here the Bf 109 of Fw Verlings of I./JG 52, shot down on 2 September, is carted away on a lorry belonging to F W Nicholls & Co Ltd. A civilian contractor who did a lot of work with No. 49 MU. I would guess that the two New Zealand soldiers had either been guarding the wreck or are simply hitching a lift!





*Yet another diversion, and an illustration of how one story leads to another! It’s one of the things about history, you never know where it will take you. Since the Northern Aluminium factory on the Southam Rd (later called Alcan) was an obvious target for enemy bombers during the War, a dummy factory was built by technicians from Shepperton Studios, two miles to the north, known as the ‘Dummy Ally’. The real factory, located next to the Banbury Canal, was camouflaged and the decoy was built to the east of the A423 between Great Bourton and Mollington. The dummy factory was built to look as much like the real factory as possible, with pillars and finials at the entrance and a length of railway track alongside. Men were hired to keep fires burning on the site, producing smoke just like the real Alcan. In fact, they were using the building to keep pigs and chickens (I wonder if they declared them to ‘The Ministry’, yet another story). The decoy worked well as the real aluminium factory was never bombed, while the decoy was, notably on 3rd October 1940. The dummy gateposts still existed in the 1970s, while the real factory finally closed in 2009.

Decoy sites and black-market pigs and poultry; that’s a whole other subject and may be moving a little too far away from a Battle of Britain diary

 

[Tim Marlow]

The whole dummy factory thing is fascinating. There is a little more here https://www.todaysconveyancer.co.uk/partner-news/decoy-sites-one-biggest-secrets-world-war-ii/ and loads more on the net. The concept was a central part of Montgomery’s strategy at Alamein as well.

 

[AlanG]

August 17 1940

Beppo Schmid issues an intelligence appraisal in which he estimated, on the basis of reported claims and his estimates of production, that the British had only 300 serviceble fighters left.
The British in fact had 855 serviceable fighters on location at Squadrons, 289 at storage units and 84 at training units. A total of 1438.

Thinking the the RAF was a severely weakened force, Luftwaffe Commanders spent the day preparing for major actions the next day.

 

[stona]

We should have erected a statue to Schmid on the empty plinth at Trafalgar Square!

 

[stona]

Sunday 18 August

A sunny morning, but with cloud developing throughout the day

THE HARDEST DAY

‘The Hardest Day’, a term coined by Dr Alfred Price to describe today’s fighting.

By late morning the Luftwaffe had still not returned. At 11.30 5 Spitfires of No. 54 Squadron chased and shot down a reconnaissance aircraft, a Bf 110 of 7(F)LG2 off the Kent coast, but it was the calm before a storm.

At midday large scale plots begam to appear over France and began to make their way across the Channel. At 12.49 a raid estimated at 60+ crossed the coast over South Foreland. This was 60 He 111s from KG 1 escorted by at least an equal number of fighters, mostly Bf 109s, but including 20 Bf 110s of I./ZG26. One minute later a second raid, estimated 24+ but comprising 27 Do 17s of I and III./KG 76 with 12 Ju 88s and a powerful escort of at least 60 fighters crossed the coast at Beachy Head. Fighter Command expected a renewed assault on its airfields and reacted strongly. Three Squadrons were already airborne at their patrol lines, Nos. 54, 56 and 501, and between 12.45 and 13.15 another 10 were scrambled in this order, Nos.615, 65, 17, 64, 32, 610, 111, 501, 266 and 1.

The Luftwaffe’s targets were indeed Kenley and Biggin Hill. The Luftwaffe had a complicated plan which had already begun to unravel before the formations reached the English coast due to problems assembling and ordering formations in the cloudy conditions over France.

501 Squadron was the first to make contact, before being bounced by escort fighters. The squadron split into sections and chased the German aircraft all over Kent. No 56 Squadron attacked a formation of Bf 110s over Ashford. 65 Squadron attacked a formation of He 111s over the Thames estuary and 610 caught the bombers bombing Biggin Hill. The second formation was heading from Beachy Head to Kenley and was intercepted over Tonbridge by 615 Squadron, which was in turn bounced by the escorts. No 32 Squadron attacked a formation of Do 17s head on and then engaged Bf 110s. Some aircraft of 501 Squadron also engaged at this time. No 111 Squadron came up from Croydon and attacked the low level Do 17s as they swept in over Kenley.

One of a remarkable series of photographs taken from one of the Do 17s of 9./KG76 as they swept in for their low level attack on Kenley. Clearly visible is a Spitfire of No 64 Squadron in its blast pen.



As the raids withdrew, they were attacked by Nos. 1, 266 and 17 Squadrons, and a single Spitfire from 92 Squadron.

At the end of this action the RAF had lost 13 fighters shot down, many more damaged, and another 6 destroyed on the ground at Kenley and Manston. The Luftwaffe had lost 20 aircraft, with many more damaged.

The next action took place to the west in 10 Group’s area. At 14.00 a force estimated at 80+ was plotted of Cherbourg, heading across the Channel. It comprised about 60 Ju 87s of I./StG3 and StG77 with a huge escort of approximately 150 Bf 109s. Fighter Command had No 601 Squadron already patrolling Tangmere and a further five squadrons, Nos 213, 152, 43, 602 and 234 were despatched. No 234 Squadron first met the raid just off the Isle of Wight but could not fight through to the bombers. 43 and 601 Squadrons engaged the Ju 87s over Selsey Bill before the formation split, heading for the airfields at Thorney Island and Ford (neither were Fighter Command airfields) and the RDF station at Poling. 602 attacked the Ju 87s over Ford and 151 and 213 squadrons got into action as the raiders withdrew.

The RAF lost 3 fighters shot down, another was written off. The RDF station at Poling was off air until the end of the month, a serious concern as Ventnor was already off air and coverage of the Solent was now very limited. The Luftwaffe had again come off worse. It lost 20 aircraft in this raid, including 14 Ju 87s. Many more were damaged, and some written off. The consequences for the Luftwaffe’s much vaunted dive bomber would be serious and rapid, they would be suspended from operations against Britain tomorrow.

At 16.30 another build up was detected over France all heading for 11 Groups area. Three separate raids were identified, they were 60 of KG 53’s He 111 with an escort of 30 Bf 110s from ZG26, 60 Do 17s from KG2 with 20 Bf 109s and 25 Do 17s (III./KG2?) with a larger escort of about 40 Bf 109s. Fighter Command scrambled nine squadrons between 16.50 and 17.45 in this order, Nos 501, 54, 56, 257, 32, 46, 85, 151 and 1. Flights from six other squadrons were ordered to maintain standing patrols over 11 Group airfields around London. Nos 32 and 501 Squadrons intercepted the most northerly raid and chased it back along the Kent coast. 54 Squadron met the next raid over the Thames estuary and chased it along the Thames. The third formation was turned back by Nos 56, 257, 85, 151 and 46 Squadrons before reaching its targets. The RAF lost 5 of its fighters, but the Luftwaffe lost 13 aircraft.

This was the day that British propaganda trumpeted a rather optimistic 140-16 ‘score line’. The RAF had lost 39 aircraft (including those destroyed on the ground) to the Luftwaffe’s 61 aircraft shot down, another 31 damaged and 7 later written off. It had been the hardest day, but it was hardest for the Luftwaffe.

 

[stona]

Monday 19th August

A cloudy day with showers in the east.

Today both sides took stock.

According to its own figures the Luftwaffe had lost 246 fighters and 298 bombers since 8th August. However well it thought it was doing against the British, this was clearly not sustainable. Goering gathered his senior officers for a conference at Karinhall. A series of directives resulted, most notable that operations using the Ju 87 were to cease immediately. The time to cross the Channel from Cherbourg was giving the RAF too much time to react. Most of the fighters in this area would be moved from Luftflotte 3 to Luftflotte 2 in the Pas de Calais. Luftflotte 3’s twin engine bombers would henceforth fly at night. Losses of senior officers were mounting and consequently no more than one would fly on subsequent raids. Goering sent a message to bomber units. I can’t reproduce the entire text here, but I would like to dispel one myth. Here is the third paragraph.

“Only a part of the fighter escort will be provided to the bombers as close escort. The goal must be to employ as many free ranging fighters (Freijagd) as possible, so that they can simultaneously protect the bombers and intercept enemy fighters under favourable conditions. For such operations there can be no rigid plan, their execution depends on both enemy tactics and weather.”

My bold.
It was the bomber leaders who asked for close escort. Goering was a fighter pilot and understood that tying his fighters rigidly to the bomber formations would place them at a disadvantage. He never ordered any such thing. The reason this myth has passed into the common understanding of the Battle is because it was promoted after the war by certain Luftwaffe fighter leaders in an effort to deflect blame for their own failures onto a now dead Goering. It has subsequently gained credibility by repetition. I just read it in an otherwise excellent account of the Battle by Patrick Bishop, published in 2009, along with another myth, that Bf 110s would be escorted by Bf 109s. Only the bomb carrying fighter bomber (‘Jabo’) Bf 110s were escorted this way and it was not something new as of today.

Fighter Command also took stock. Since August 8th it had written off 54 Spitfires and 121 Hurricanes with many more damaged. The supply of aircraft was not a concern, but in the same period 94 pilots had been killed (or were missing) with another 60 badly enough wounded that they were no longer operational. On 17 August Fighter Command was 350 operational pilots short of its full strength of 1,300. Park also sent instructions to his controllers in 11 Group. Again, I can’t reproduce them here, but they asked them to engage enemy formations over land or within gliding distance of the coast (‘we cannot afford to lose pilots through forced landings in the sea’.) He wanted just pairs of aircraft sent out after reconnaissance aircraft. He also suggested that once an enemy formation had crossed the coast heading for the airfields, a Sector Training Flight or even No. 1 (Canadian) and No. 303 (Polish) Squadrons could be used to patrol below the clouds over the airfields. This, despite the fact that these were not operational units at the time.

There was little action today as both combatant air forces licked their wounds.

At 14.49 four Spitfires of No 602 Squadron chased a Ju 88 from 7./KG 51 and shot it down into the sea off Bognor, immediately ignoring Park’s advice. P/O H W Moody was shot down by return fire from the bomber, managing to bale out over land near North Bersted, West Sussex. He was burned and had splinters in his left thigh but made it back to his squadron at the end of the month.

At 18.45 six Spitfires, three each from Nos. 19 and 66 Squadrons set off after a Do 17 of 7./KG2 off the coast of Aldeburgh. The Dornier was shot down but P/O J A P Studd of 66 Squadron abandoned his Spitfire south of Orfordness. He was recovered by the Aldeburgh lifeboat but had drowned.

At the end of today the Luftwaffe had lost 3 aircraft with another damaged. The RAF had lost 4 of its fighters with another damaged.

Following the events of ‘the hardest day’ and those of the previous weeks, the first cracks began to appear in Luftwaffe morale. There was a feeling among the Luftwaffe's pilots that they were not winning, and that the Fighter Command being met over the skies of Britain was not the same as the one described in intelligence briefings. The RAF seemed as strong, or stronger than ever. Obltn Hahn of I./JG3 recorded that

‘utter exhaustion had set in. For the first time pilots discussed the prospects of being posted to a quieter sector’.

Some cases of Kanalkrankheit (Channel sickness) began to appear. Ulrich Steinhilper described the symptoms and the creative ‘cure’ developed by the Luftwaffe’s doctors.

‘At first there were isolated cases but, as the battle dragged on, there were more and more cases of the evil disease. The symptoms were many and various but usually surfaced in stomach cramps and vomiting, loss of appetite and consequently weight and acute irritability. Typically the patients consumption of alcohol and cigarettes would increase and he would show more and more signs of exhaustion…The principle of battle fatigue had not yet been established and it was felt that as soon as anyone was taken out of the line because he was showing signs of stress, there would be a flood. So, the doctors resorted to a diagnosis of appendicitis. This minor operation ensured that at least a pilot would not be flying for two or three weeks.’

The British pilots too were exhausted and stressed (though they kept any such feelings to themselves). Fighter Command squadrons were still rotating in and out of 10 and 11 Groups, a luxury not afforded to their German opponents. Today, for example, No.616 Squadron, based in 12 Group and which in the words of P/O Lionel Casson had ‘chased about after a few reconnaissance jobs and enjoyed great success during the ‘Junkers Party’ off Flamborough Head a few days ago’ replaced No 64 Squadron at Kenley. No 64 Squadron flew north to Leconfield for a well earned respite.

The British had no way of knowing how well they were doing, being more concerned with their own losses in what had become a battle of attrition.

 

[stona]

Tuesday 20 August.

Fine over the Channel at first but cloud and rain spreading from the north.

The first action of the day occurred of Lowestoft, when 6 Spitfires of No. 66 Squadron intercepted 3 Bf 110s of Epgr 210 who were looking for shipping to attack, shooting one down into the sea with the loss of its crew. P/O Cooke later remembered

“the rear gunner firing continually during the whole of the descent from 10,000-12,000 ft. down to sea level when it finally ditched. I was much impressed by the actions of the German crew. One at least of the crew, I think the pilot, escaped from the a/c and started to swim, in what direction neither he nor I could know precisely, but as I flew over him he looked up and shook his fist at me! I reported by radio and rescue services were alerted, but neither a/c nor crew were found. They were a brave crew. I admit I was impressed and sorry they could not be saved. I would like to record my admiration for the bravery of the enemy crew”

At about 14.45 a force estimated at 80+ was picked up over Calais and by the time the raid crossed the coast south of Margate this had been revised to ‘190’ aircraft. In fact, it comprised 30 Do 17s with an escort of 20 Bf 109s. The raid made its way along the north Kent coast towards the Canterbury area, leading the British to believe that Eastchurch was again the target. 12 Spitfires from No. 65 Squadron were despatched with 21 Hurricanes from Nos. 9 and 12 Squadrons. A Do 17 and a Bf 109 were shot down, 1 of the 65 Squadron Spitfires made a forced landing on Havengore Island (Foulness) with an engine damaged in combat by a Bf 109. Oddly, no bombs were reported to have been dropped.

A notable event today was the first victory by one of the Polish squadrons. No. 303 would claim the glory when it became operational, but today a Ju 88 of 8./KG 30 was shot down by a section of No 302 (Polish) Squadron near Hull. Green Section comprised S/Ldr W A J Satchell, P/O S Wapniarek and F/Lt Jastrzebski and the victory was shared by the first two, Jastrzebski manoeuvred to make his attack but lost the Junkers in cloud and never opened fire. The pilot of this aircraft, Uffz Franz-Georg Wolff, made a forced landing after one engine was stopped and a fire started in the cockpit, he also hoped to save two badly wounded crew men. Unfortunately, both injured men died of their wounds (on 21st and 22nd).

Here is a picture of the first ‘Polish’ victim of the Battle of Britain, burnt out at Patrington, near Hull.



At the end of today the Luftwaffe had lost 6 aircraft with 2 more damaged. The RAF lost 2 fighters with 2 more damaged.

 

[AlanG]

August 20 1940

Churchill addresses the House of Commons with his now famous speech;

"The gratitude of every home in our island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of world war by their prowess and their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few"

 

[Tim Marlow]

Hi Alan, famous perhaps, but surely not infamous?

 

[AlanG]

Correct.... edited